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Bu çalışmanın amacı Somali devlet inşası ve istikrarı sürecinde Türk sivil güçlerinin 
rolünü ortaya çıkarmaktır. Özellikle bu tez Somali devletin kapasitesini ve 
sosyoekonomik faktörlerinin artırılmasının yanında ülkede barış sürecinde Türkiye'nin 
rolünün etkileri anlatılacak. Kısaca bu çalışmanın temel amacı Türkiye’nin sivil 
yaklaşım müdahalesi ile Somali’nin istikrar süreci arasındaki ilişkiyi belirlemektir. 
Diğer bir ifade ile bu yazı amacı devlet kurumlarını ve sosyoekonomik kalkınmayı 
arttırmak, Somali barış inşası ve siyasi süreçte Türk sivil iktidarın rolünü incelemektir. 
Bu çalışma aşağıdaki iki sorunun cevabını bulmayı amaçlamıştır:  
1. Türkiye'nin sivil güç müdahalesi Somali devlet inşa sürecinin üzerinde olumlu 
etkisi olmuş mudur? 
2. İlk soru bulgularına ve Somali devlet inşası bağlamında genel literatüre 
dayanarak, 
Çalışma, "Somali'yi istikrara kavuşturmak için sivil yaklaşım, devlet inşası ve 
ülkenin stabilizasyonu için göz önünde bulundurulacak bir model olacak mı? 
Metodoloji 
Çalışmanın doğası dolayı, bu tez bir nitel araştırma yöntemi kullanmaktadır. 
Araştırmanın amacı doğrultusunda, çalışma, sosyal bilimsel literatürü ve birincil 
kaynaklardan kullanacaktır. Her ne kadar mevcut olursa, uzmanlar, akademisyenler ve 
politika yapıcılar istişare ve görüşmeler yapılmaktadır. Dahası, ilgili kitaplar, makaleler, 
dergiler, raporlar, politika ve strateji belgeleri, haber kaynakları ve diğer ilgili belgeler 






Somali, 1991 yılında devlet çöküşünden bu yana çeşitli uluslararası müdahaleler 
yaşadı.  Çoğunlukla o müdahaleleri doğrudan askeri alanda olmuştur; Ancak, hiçbiri 
istenilen sonuçlar vermemiştir. İlk girişim Somali istikrarı sağlamak için, 1992 
Birleşmiş Milletler tarafından askeri yöntemle oldu. Ancak Somali'nin savaş ağaları ile 
yoğun savaş nedeniyle, operasyon başarısız oldu ve Mart ayında 1995'te Birleşmiş 
Milletler güçlerinin Somali'den tam çekilmesi ile sona erdi. İkinci girişim, dini 
motivasyonlu İslamcı unsurlara karşı mücadele nedeniyle, 2006 yılında Somali'de ABD 
destekli Etiyopya işgali oldu. Küresel terörle mücadele savaşının bir parçası olarak, 
Amerika Birleşik Devletleri ülkeyi işgal için en az 15.000 Etiyopyalı kuvvetleri, (Lone, 
2006) destekleyerek Somali'de bir vekil savaşını kışkırttı. Ancak, Etiyopya ve Somalili 
arasındaki tarihsel düşmanlık, Al Shabab gibi daha radikal unsurları ortaya çıkarmış, 
kısacası Etiyopya askerleri Somali durumunu daha kötü duruma sokmuşlardır. Böylece 
Al Şebbab Güney Somali'nin kontrolünü ele geçirmiş ve Etiyopya askerleri, 2009 
yılında arkalarında enkaz bırakarak ülkeyi terk etmişlerdir.  
Üçüncü girişimde, 19 Ocak 2007 tarihinde Afrika Birliği Barış ve Güvenlik Konseyi 
tarafından Somali'de Afrika Birliği Misyonu (AMISOM) adıyla kurulan kurumun 20 
Şubat 2007 tarihinde Birleşmiş Milletler Güvenlik Konseyi tarafından Somali de 
yetkilendirilmesiyle ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu askerlerin temel hedefi, gerekli tüm araçları 
kullanılarak Al Şebab mücadele ve Somali hükümetini desteklemektir. Ancak Somali'de 
7 yıl aktif olan, Afrika Birliği misyonu henüz hedeflerine ulaşmak için başarılı 
olmamıştır. 
Bu başarısız girişimleri hatırlatarak: bu çalışmada Somali devletinin yeniden inşasında 
 Türkiye'nin 2011 sonrası stratejisinin  diğer birçok 
uluslararası aktörün yaklaşımlarından farklı olduğu kabülünden hareket ederek Türk 
dışişleri bakanı askeri müdahalenin Somali devlet inşası ve istikrar süreci için bir çözüm 
olmayacağını açıkça söylemiştir. Böylece, Türkiye'nin Somali politikasının 
Davutoğlu'nun kelimelerin ışığında şu şekilde olmuştur: 
"Somali'nin son yirmi yıl boyunca, sayısız girişimler alınmıştır, [...] birçok 




müdahale yapılmıştır. Şimdi, bu yeniden değerlendirme yapmanın zamanıdır, ve 
üç sütun üzerine dayalı entegre bir strateji geliştirmelidir. İlk insani yardım, 
kalkınma ve yeniden yapılanma, İkinci, güvenliği artırmak ve kamu düzenini 
kurmak ve üçüncüsü, bir siyasi süreç ile  kapsayıcı bir demokratik hükümete 
ulaşmak” 
Türkiye'nin Somali devlet Inşası faaliyetleri 
Barış ve güvenlik 
Güvenlik Somali’nin karşı karşıya kaldığı temel zorluk olduğu gibi, Türkiye Somali’nin 
güvenlik hizmetlerine yatırım yaparak, ülkenin barış inşası ve istikrar konusunda net bir 
politika yürütmüştür. Somali'de aktif bir askeri sistemin olmamasından dolayı, Türkiye 
Somali’nin yeniden yapılandırılması ve Somali güvenlik kurumlarının kapasitesinin 
geliştirilmesi için çalışır. Genellikle bu çabalar dayalı politikalar Somali'de Türkiye'nin 
sivil elinin ülkenin barış inşası sürecine katkıda bulunduğunu ispatlamıştır. Yani 
Türkiye  Somali’nin güvenlik güçlerinin kalitesinin ve miktarının artırmaya yönelik 
olarak AMISOM’a destek vererek  büyük yatırım ve ülkede uzun vadeli istikrar kurmak 
için Somali güvenlik servislerinin yeniden inşası öncelik vermektedir. Böylece bu 
anlamda bu çalışma da Somali'de Türkiye'nin katılımı, ülkenin barış inşasında etkili bir 
şekilde olumlu katkı sağladığını iddia edebilir. 
Siyasi Süreç 
Somali'nin hem devlet başarısızlığının büyüklüğünü hem de uluslararası aktörlerin 
çelişkili ilgisini fark eden Türkiye, Somali'nin siyasi sürecini ele alma konsunda çok 
boyutlu bir yaklaşım ortaya çıkarmıştır. Somali için diğer devletler tarafından 
düzenlenen uluslararası konferanslar katılmanın yanında Türkiye, ayrıca Somali'nin 
devlet inşası ve istikrarı sürecine birçok siyasi konferanslara ev sahipliği yapmış ve 
yapmaktadır. Bu konferanslardan biri: İstanbul konferansı (1 &2), 2010 ve 2012 yılında 
düzenlenen ve Somali geleceğini tartışmak üzere diğer ülkelerden üst düzey uluslararası 
yetkililer ve Somali’den de liderler katılmıştır. Bu konferansların sonucunda ülkede 
yeni bir liderlik, parlamento ve anayasa ile kalıcı bir federal hükümetin oluşturulması 
gerektiği sonucu ortaya çıkmıştır. 




arabuluculuk rolü üstlenmiştir, Özellikle, Somaliland ve merkezi hükümet konsunda. 
Türk Dışişleri Bakanlığı, her iki taraf ile (Somali merkez devlet ve Somaliland) 
aracılığında büyük bir rol oynamıştır. 
Devlet kapasite geliştirme 
Türkiye, devlet kurumlarının yeniden inşasında birçok alanda Somali’ye destek vermiş 
ve vermektedir. Türkiye devlet kurumlarının çoğu yardımcı olmak ve uzmanlık sağlama 
konusunda Somalili meslektaşları ile ortaklık yapmıştır. Kısacası Somali, kurumdan 
kuruma ilişkiler ile katkı sağlamıştır: bakanlıktan bakanlığa, parlamentoya meclisten 
parlamentoya meclise, belediyeden belediyeye gibi. 
Türkiye’nin Somali devlet inşasında desteklenen başlıca alanlar 
·  Bütçe desteği 
· Hükümet personel eğitimi, 
· Yerel yönetimlerin kapasitelerinin artırılması 
· Kilit devlet kurumlarının altyapısını oluşturma 
Argümanlar 
Türkiye'nin sivil güç yaklaşımı Somali'nin devlet inşasında ve istikrar sürecinde olumlu 
bir etkiye sahip olmuştur. Kısaca bu çalışmanın vardığı sonuç argüman şu olmuştur: 
Somali'de Türkiye'nin katılımı devlet kapasitesini ve ülkenin sosyo-ekonomik gelişimi, 
barış binası, ve siyasi sürecine olumlu katkısı olmuştur. 
 






When the Somalia state collapsed in 1991, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 
created under the resolution 751 (1992), the ‘United Nations Operation in Somalia 
(UNOSOM)’  on 24th April 1992, to monitor cease-fire in Mogadishu and deliver 
humanitarian assistance to the needy people. Though the mission’s earlier objective was a 
humanitarian intervention, its role was broadened to include peacemaking mission and more 
encompassing state building activities in subsequent UNSC resolutions. Notwithstanding, as 
the operation failed due to the intense battle with the Somalia warlords, the mission fetched 
up with complete withdrawal of the United Nations forces from Somalia in early March 
1995.  However, the failure of the mission in 1995 and the succeeding international efforts to 
stabilize the country,  have not only shaped to rethink the strategies employed toward the 
Somalia state building, but has also created an international debate about the impact of 
military intervention to stabilize failed and fragile states (Yoo, 2011, p. 111). Beside many 
international efforts to stabilize Somalia since 1991, the country has been without fully 
functioning government for over two decades.   
 
In order to understand the contemporary role of civilian powers to rebuild failed states, this 
thesis will attempt to assess Turkey’s role in the Somalia state building process, especially, in 
the period of 2011 aftermath; when then Prime Minister Erdogan visited Somalia. The ‘state 
building’ is a broad contemporary term, however, it is greatly associated with a number of 
activities including: peace building, political reconciliation, enhancing the capacity of state 
institutions and socioeconomic reconstruction. By examining the civilian power strategies 
such as diplomacy rather than coercive hard power, economic solution to political problems, 
and the centrality of mediation, the study will look Turkey’s policies to rebuild the Somali 
state building capacity. The thesis will utilize international literature, news sources, and 
relevant documents to analyze the role of Turkey as a civilian power actor in each of these 
activities.  
 
Throughout the analysis, the paper will argue that Turkey’s civilian power approach to 
Somalia has a positive impact to the country’s state building and stabilization process. This 
means, that Turkey’s involvement has contributed positively to the process of peace building, 





As the literature review will show, scholars have looked at each of the different prospectives 
in detail, however, currently there remains a need for the overview produced in this 
dissertation. 
1.1. Purpose of the Study  
 
The purpose of this study is to determine and describe the role of Turkish civilian power in 
Somalia state building and stabilization process. Particularly, the study will portray the sound 
effects of Turkey’s role in Somalia’s peace building, political process, enhancing the capacity 
of state, and socioeconomic developments.  
1.2. Objectives of the study  
 
1. Find out the relationship between civilian power intervention and Somalia state 
building and stabilization process. 
2. To examine the role of Turkish civilian power in Somalia peace building process.  
3. To determine the role of Turkish civilian power in the Somali political process.  
4. To describe the role of Turkey in rebuilding and enhancing the Somalia state 
institutions. 
5. To explore Turkey’s socioeconomic investment and development aid in Somalia’s 
recovery and stability.   
1.3. Research Questions  
 
1. What is the relationship between civil power intervention and Somalia state building 
and stability?  
2. What is the role of Turkish civilian power in Somalia’s peace building and political 
reconciliation? 
3. What is the role of Turkey in rebuilding and enhancing the capacity of state 
institutions, and socioeconomic development in Somalia’s recovery and stability? 
1.4.  Hypothesis  
 
Civilian powers’ intervention (which mainly utilize diplomacy and economic aid) to stabilize 
fragile and failed states yields more desired results to stabilize, than utilizing hard power 




this hypothesis, The International communities heavily rely on hard power strategies to 
stabilize Somalia and rebuild the state has taken to stabilize Somalia for over two decades.  
 
Turkey’s Civilian power intervention in post 2011 period, to stabilize Somalia has been 
lucrative, unlike its 1992 strategy. The 1992 policy had focused and utilized hard power 
means to rebuild the Somalia state, however, as it failed, Turkeky’s 2011 civilian power 
policy was more effective to contribute to the Somalia state building and stability.  
1.5.  Methodology  
 
Because of the nature of the study, this dissertation employs a qualitative research method. 
For the purpose of the research, the study will utilize both social scientific literature and 
primary sources. As much as they are available, experts, academicians and policy makers are 
consulted and interviewed. Further, relevant books, articles, journals, reports, policy and 
strategy papers, news sources and other relevant documents are consulted. More importantly, 
the study utilizes agreements and protocols relating to the topic.  
1.6.  Significance of the Study 
 
Somalia’s state collapse and civil war have not only been a burden to the Somali people, but 
also has affected the East African region by posing a security threat and hindering the 
region’s development. Despite the numerous international efforts, the country has been 
lawless for over two decades, which has caused to the emergence of militant extremists. 
Although Somalia has shown signs of recovery for the last three years, the country is yet 
vulnerable and fragile, as it is rebuilding its state institutions once again with the support of 
the international community.  
 
The study will be a significant endeavor in understanding the role of the international 
community in Somalia state building, and with particular, the study will illuminate the role of 
Turkey’s civilian power in the Somali state building process. The findings and 
recommendations of this study will be useful to the Somalia government leadership, regional 
and international actors involved in Somalia state building to have a better understanding of 
the impact and the significant contribution of their efforts to the Somalia’s stability and state 
building. By outlining specifically the study will be useful to underscore Turkey’s strategies 




contribute to the international conflict studies, and more specifically, to the academic studies 
of Somalia state building and conflict resolution.  The researcher hopes that this study will 
form a base for further research in this field. 
1.7. Organization of the study  
 
The study structured into six main chapters. The first chapter is introductory and covers the 
research framework, methodology, the significance and the blue print of the study. In the 
second chapter, the paper will discuss the relevant theoretical bases, key concepts and 
variables of the study,  the role of civilian powers in state building in fragile situations, and 
the civilian power actions in Turkish foreign policy. In this chapter, the study will only deal 
with the secondary data relevant to the main variables of the study. The third chapter, the 
study, will discuss the background of Somalia state building and the international role since 
1991. In this chapter, the study will elaborate the role of the international community’s efforts 
in peace building process and political reconciliation since the Somalia state collapse in 1991. 
In the fourth chapter, the thesis, will discuss the historical background of Somalia and 
Turkish relations, from the past to the modern age. In this chapter, the paper will present 
Turkey’s historic relation with Somalia, its military intervention in 1991 to stabilize the 
country after state collapse, and its humanitarian intervention in 2011 and the growing 
relations since Erdogan’s visit to Mogadishu in 2011. In this chapter, the study will also 
discuss, Somalia in the context of Turkish foreign policy. The fifth chapter, which is the core 
of the study, will discuss Turkey’s role in Somalia state building and stabilization process 
especially in the post 2011 era. In this chapter, the study will present Turkeys’s state building 
activities in Somalia such as peace building political process and enhancing state capacity 
institutions. The sixth chapter, the study will analyze and discuss the findings of the study 




2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 2.1. Introduction  
 
End of the Cold War marked the evolution of fragile and failed states as a consequence of 
losing legitimacy and capacity to effectively govern themselves (Huria, 2009, p. 1). Chaos, 
civil wars and even terrorist incidents erupted in some countries due to a power vacuum, and 
collapse of state institutions. As this study aims not investigate and list the causes constitutes 
to state failure, however, the study scrutinizes the different strategies performed by the 
international community to deal with the fragile situations. By taking Somalia, as a case study 
of state failure, the study will examine the role of international actors, with specific 
assessment of Turkey, in Somali state building and recovery. Presuming Turkey as a civilian 
power, the paper examines the strategies and policies of Turkey to rebuild the Somali state, 
and stabilize that country. This chapter discusses and puts forward the literature and the 
secondary date of this study, by starting with defining the key concepts and variables of the 
study, the study will conclude the correlation of the variables of the study theoretically and 
practically. 
2.2. Key terms and concepts 
 
Before going down to the analysis of the study, it is necessary to clarify the meaning of 
several key concepts, which form the basis of this dissertation and will be widely used in the 
literature and the analysis of the variables of the study. Two concepts stand out as lying at the 
core of this study: civilian power and state building concepts. In addition to defining these 
concepts, the study examines the literature of civilian power actions and the international 
support to state building in fragile states and situations. The chapter starts to define and 
examine the civilian power as an independent variable of this study, subsequently; the study 
will define and discuss the state building terms and concepts as the dependent variables of 
this paper. 
2.2.1. The Concept of Civilian Power  
 
The concept of Civilian Power was firstly used by Francois Duchene in 1970s to describe the 
Civilian Power Europe (CPE) as a distinctive role for Europe to emphasize mainly on low 




124). Duchene indicated the foreign policy of the European Community to be an exemplar of 
a new period in political civilization by increasing its international influence using civilian 
power means. Although the Duchene’ concept hadn’t got much popularity in his earlier 
suggestions, however, the concept received great attention of academic literature in recent 
years as many scholars attempted to describe or analyze the EU or examine particular 
countries’ foreign policy as civilian or military power (Smith, 2005: 1). 
As the meaning of the concept gives laterally, civilian power is non-military, and includes 
economic, diplomatic and cultural policy instruments (Smith, 2005: 1), which in turn 
absolutely different from military power, which refers to the use of armed forces (Smith, 
2005: 1).  As William quoted from Christopher H., the concept of civilian power can be 
defined as ‘The Acceptance of the necessity of cooperation with others in the pursuit of 
international objectives; the concentration on non-military, primary economic, means to 
secure national goals, with military power left as a residual instrument serving essentials to 
safeguard other means of international interaction; and willingness to develop supranational 
structures to address critical issues of international management’ (Maul, 1990 qtd. in 
William: 5). As this definition refers to,  Maul emphasized on three critical elements which 
the Civilian powers has to conform to: first the acceptance of the necessity of cooperation 
with others in the pursuit of international objectives; second the concentration on non-
military, primarily economic means to secure national goals, with military power left as a 
residual instrument serving essentially to safeguard other means of international interaction; 
and third: a willingness to develop supranational structures to address critical issues of 
international management (Maull, 1990, qtd. in Smith: 2).  
Being a civilian power, there are, in other words, four important elements to be met as Smith 
argues: means; ends; use of persuasion; and civilian control over foreign (and defense) policy 
making (Smith, 2005: 2). In other words, civilian power promotes to engage in diplomatic 
rather than coercive instruments, it focuses on mediation to resolve conflicting parties, uses 
economic solutions to political problems, and considers the importance of indigenous peoples 
to determine their own fate, in resolving the international seizures (Hill, 1983 qtd. in William: 
5). According to Duchene (Orbie, 2006: 124) the concept of civilian power emphasizes 
mainly on low politics, non-state actors, ideational influence and international 
interdependence, as a means of international engagement. In the following sections, the study 




2.2.1.1. Low politics  
 
Low politics is a concept that covers all matters that are not absolutely vital to the survival of 
the state such as the economy of the country and social affairs. The low politics as civilian 
power concept’s core element covers the domains of the state's welfare, contrary to high 
politics, which concerns the state's survival and strict national security (Jackson, 2007: 106). 
High politics are ‘the Hobbesian ingredients that matters to the very survival of the nation 
state, as national and international security concerns’ (Brein, 2008: 1-2). The civilian power 
actors employ low politics as main foreign policy; however, the classical realists do merely 
consider high politics as relevant as they entirely reject the low politics. Unlikely, the 
complex interdependence of the liberal theory considers the low politics as a fundamental 
without rejecting the high politics. 
 
2.2.1.2. Non-State Actors 
 
Although states remain as the most significant actors in the international system, however, 
the civilian power concept contends that non-state actors in today’s world have an increasing 
influence and power in the international relations (Orbie, 2006: 124). According to the 
National Intelligence Council of the United States, non-state Actors are non-sovereign 
entities that exercise significant economic, political, or social power and influence on a 
national and international level (National Intelligence Council (NIC), 2007, p. 2). These 
actors include trade unions, community organizations, religious institutions, ethnic groupings, 
and universities in this category (National Intelligence Council (NIC), 2007, p. 2). Non-state 
actors can be categorized into three types: non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and transnational corporations (TNCs), as they all 
play roles alongside national states in matters of international regulation and coordination 
(Reinalda, 2011, p. 3).  Due to the globalization and the emergence of powerful civil society, 
non state actors’ international influence has increased as they are assuming roles that 
previously held by the states. Civilian powers make use and collaborate with the increasing 







2.2.1.3. Ideational influences  
 
 The ideational influence is another important notion of the civilian power concept and can be 
christened to the actors’ understanding and interpretation of the international system. Ideas as 
defined by Craig Parsons are ‘subjective claims about descriptions of the world, causal 
relationships, or the normative legitimacy of certain actions’ (Parsons, 2002, p. 48). 
According to Parson, such ideas acquire meaning in the empirical realm through the actor’s 
ability to intervene, or to refrain from such, with the effect of influencing a specific process 
or state of affairs’ (Temperley, 2013). The ideas have stimulus to change the international 
relations as they empower actors through discourse, and as they shape the identities which 
determine individual and state interests (Temperley, 2013).  
 
Civilian powers emphasis on shared ideas to influence the international systems. This 
practice is significantly different from those of the material explanation in construing the 
international relations. Material explanation of state behavior is based on the objective 
distribution of tangible power. Aspirations, beliefs, and other ideas are not considered as 
relevant variables’ (Fangyin, 2007, p. 449). This type of analysis is generally defended by 
realist scholars such as Kenneth Waltz as explained in his Theory of International Politics’ 
book. These theories in the realist tradition ‘portray a politically fragmented world of 
pervasive insecurity, recurring violence, generalized expectations of war, and self-animating 
strategic logic against strategic logic’ (Ashley, 1981, p. 205). This type of explanation is 
based on the form of cognition: that the actor’s strategies to influence the international system 
are mainly material not ideas. In contrast to these theories of realism and hard power, civilian 
power actors uses ideas, beliefs, aspiration and values in an attempt to influence the 
international system.  
 
2.2.1.4. International Interdependence 
 
Unlike the Realists, civilian power actors contend that the international system is 
characterized by growing interdependence; and mutual responsibility to the global 
challenges. In their critique of political realism, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye argue that 
states and their fortunes are inextricably tied together (Kegley & Blanton, 2011, p. 41). The 
scholars recognized that the various international connections and interdependencies between 




decreasing but remain important (Keohane & Nye, 2001, p. 20). Using the concept of 
interdependence, Keohane and Nye (Keohane & Nye, 2001, p. 20) also importantly 
differentiated between interdependence and dependence in analyzing the role of power in 
politics and the relations between international actors. From the analysis, complex 
interdependence of international relations is characterized by three things, involving (1) the 
use of multiple channels of action between societies in interstate, trans governmental, 
and transnational relations, (2) the absence of a hierarchy of issues with changing agendas 
and linkages between issues prioritized and the objective of (3) bringing about a decline in 
the use of military force and coercive power in international relations (Keohane & Nye, 2001, 
p. 21). 
 
Civilian powers contend that the interdependence of the countries will reduce the likelihood 
of using military muscles against each. Liberals have been the most forceful advocates of the 
international interdependence concept of the civilian power and have stressed a variety of 
different causal mechanisms in developing it (Pollins, 2001, p. 2). For liberals, International 
interdependence, primarily at the level of the nation-state—is that economic exchange and 
military conquest are substitute means of acquiring the resources needed to promote political 
security and economic growth. As trade and foreign investment increase, there are fewer 
incentives to meet these needs through territorial expansion, and foreign conquest. 
Conversely, barriers to international economic activity stimulate conflicts of interest that can 
contribute to political-military discord (Pollins, 2001, p. 2), thus Civilian power argue that the 
decline of military force as a policy tool and the increase in economic and other forms of 









2.2.2. The Concept of State Building  
 
State building is the dependent variable of this study, which also needs to be defined. But, 
before going down to the definition of this term, let us come with a common definition of 
what the state means according to this study. Until now, a number of definitions have been 
given by scholars, which gave different meanings to the term of state. Some definitions 
highlight the authority, institutional presence of the state (law and order) and territorial 
boundaries of the state (OECD, 2011, p. 20), while other definitions emphasized on the 
infrastructural power of the state; the effectiveness of state’s capacities to provide services 
(OECD, 2011, p. 20). Finally, other definitions emphasized the centrality of state-society 
relations, how the nexus between social expectations and state capacity is mediated; how 
political power is exercised; and how service provision and resource allocation are 
determined (OECD, 2011, p. 20). This study’s operational definition combines the above 
mentioned meanings by necessitating the institutional presence of the state, the capacity to 
provide service, and the state-society relations, all, as significant elements of the state. 
However, states fail or become fragile as they run out to perform and loose legitimacy. The 
state becomes fragile when it “has weak capacity to carry out basic functions of governing a 
population and its territory, and lacks the ability to develop mutually constructive and 
reinforcing relations with society” (Jörn Grävingholt, 2012, p. 5) As a result, trust and mutual 
obligations between the state and its citizens becomes weak (OECD, 2011, p. 21). The 
international community supports fragile and failed states, to rebuild the capacity of state 
institutions, and mediate between political rivalries.  
 
2.2.2.1 State building  
 
State building as a broad concept which includes peace building was defined in the Policy 
Guidance document that has resulted from the International Network on Conflict and 
Fragility (INCAF), as ‘an endogenous process to enhance capacity, institutions and 
legitimacy of the state driven by state–society relations” (OECD, 2011, p. 20). State building 
is a painful process, especially when it takes place in conflict-affected countries, like 
Somalia, since it is too risky for the international actors to penetrate and learn the situation on 





While donors, assist the fragile states with humanitarian and development aid, however, to 
rebuild the state, there are three significant aspects that the international community supports 
to increase the resilience of the state. The three dimensions include: 
·  First: political settlement, which reflects the implicit or explicit agreement 
(among political elites) on  power sharing, and the political processes through which 
state and society are connected. 
· Second: enhancing the capability and responsiveness of the state to effectively 
fulfil its principal functions and provide key services. 
· Third: building social expectations and perceptions about what the state should do, 
what the terms of the state-society relationships should be, and the ability of society to 
articulate demands that are “heard.” (OECD, 2011, p. 30) 
 
As a broad concept, state building also includes  peace building, which is merely one 
dimension of the all state building aspects. Peace building commonly defined as activities by 
national or international actors to prevent violent conflict to institutionalize peace. Peace 
building aims to address the root causes and effects of conflict as is not just ending of conflict 
(OECD, 2011), but also counter the causes of the conflict.  
 
Although Somalia -as our case study- is labeled ‘failed state’ since 1991, however, the 
country has shown signs of recovery and improvement in the last years. The state institutions 
are rebuilding, and the government control of the whole country has increased. Therefore, 













2.3. Role of Civilian powers in state building of fragile and failed states  
 
As the Cold War ended, civil conflicts, violence extremism and disintegration of states have 
emerged out in many parts of the world (Ottaway & Mair, 2004, p. 1). To stabilize these 
countries and prevent violent conflicts, the international organizations such as the United 
Nations started to support the countries in and post-conflict situations, as it was agreed to 
develop a joint policy to deal with the challenges posed by fragile states. Significantly, these 
policies include principle for Good International Engagement in fragile situations (Jörn 
Grävingholt, 2012, p. 36). The policy documents explain the role of the international actors 
could, and should play in the support of state building in fragile states and situations.  In 
2011, a new comprehensive program to deal with the fragile situations was adapted called 
“New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States” (Jörn Grävingholt, 2012, p. 1). This deal, 
which was supported by the donors and affected countries, aims on five state building goals 
which are (1) building legitimate politics, (2) enhancing security, (3) improving justice 
institutions (4) building economic foundations and (5) increasing revenues & services (Jörn 
Grävingholt, 2012, p. 1).  
 
Although these agreed principles exist, however, one country’s intervention into another 
country, to support the recipient, and the extent of the intervention, always devolve on the 
interest, ideas and values of the intervening country’s foreign policy instruments, according 
to some studies (Yoo, 2011, p. 1). As many international actors step up to assist the state 
building of fragile states, however, the success to accomplish goals of the mission and the 
acceptance recipient would always be different from actor to another, because of the 
strategies, priorities and the means employed by the foreign policy of these actors to resolve a 
conflict. Civilian power actors, unlike military powers support the state building of fragile 
states, as they concentrate on non-military, primarily economic  means, to resolve conflicts 
(Smith, 2005: 1).  
 
The success of the international support to the state building of the fragile states depends on 
the receptiveness of the recipient country’s political elites and population. It is therefore 
essential for donors to identify incentives for the local actors to engage in effectively to build 
the state (Jörn Grävingholt, 2012, p. 33). Many international efforts to support fragile states 
failed  due to merely employing coercive methods and military actions against  the 




instruments, using humanitarian and development assistance mechanism to all conflicting 
parts, the centrality of mediation in conflict resolution, the importance of economic solutions 
to political problems, and the need for indigenous peoples to determine their own fate 
(Christopher Hill, 1983, pp. 310-11; Trott, 2010, p. 5), civilian powers support the state 
building in fragile situations, in according to these central ideas.  Many studies suggest that 
coherent and well communicated incentives by the external actors, unlike miletry actions, to 
get the local acceptance generates consistent signals to the recipient country’s political actors, 
clearly indicating which actions provoke positive or negative sensations and thus enhances 
the leverage of external actors’ measures to support state building (Jörn Grävingholt, 2012, p. 
34).  Civilian powers’ intervention and support of these underdeveloped countries sets its 
values in encompassing solidarity with other societies, and sense of responsibility for the 






2.4. Civilian Power in Turkish Foreign Policy 
 
Upon the decay of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War in 1990, the international 
system experienced dramatic transformation of power politics (Huria, 2009, p. 1). Many 
states considered to re-strategize and abandon their externally oriented security and come up 
with new measures of low politics, and diplomacy. During the Cold War, states were mainly 
dreadful from outside threats as a consequence of the bipolar system and super power’s 
power competition.  However, with the crumble of the international power structure and the 
United States’ new world order, many states started to consider economy, diplomacy and 
cultural policy instruments as foreign policy means. With these international trends and 
power transformation, Turkish foreign policy adapted soft power means to achieve its 
national goals. Since the early 2000s, the Turkish foreign policy to fragile states seems to 
have shifted dramatically from military means to civilian power capacity assistance (Sazak & 
Murphy, 2012, p. 1). The new discourses of Turkey’s foreign policy activities include peace, 
cooperation and multidimensionalism, as a means to resolve the international conflicts 
(AKPINAR, 2013, p. 735). Since these times, Ankara has avoided military or hard power 
means to pursue national goals, and Turkish foreign policy emphasized to foster peace and 
stability in its region and the world at large to achieve its desired ambition to become an 
international actor. 
 
Turkey has attracted small powers in both its region and in the world as a result of its 
increasing use of civilian power action in its foreign relations (Tomlinson, 2013, p. 259). The 
new approach of foreign policy helped improve and expand its positive power and influence 
in the international arena. By using its rapid economic growth, Turkey strives to promote a 
positive image by giving aid and support to the least developed and developing countries in 
key state building areas (Sazak & Murphy, 2012, p. 1). As Turkey appreciated the usefulness 
of this policy, its foreign relation ‘has initiated multiple regional connections and extended its 
interests, starting with the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East’ (Tomlinson, 2013, p. 
259). In addition, Turkish Prime Minister’s visit to South Africa and Ethiopia in 2005 has 
come also with Turkey’s penetration, and influence in Africa as part of its multidimensional 
approach.  
 
Civilian power in Turkey’s foreign policy has immensely increased, especially in the terms of  




this term characterized by domestic political stability owing to single party rule, Turkish 
foreign policy of this period has qualified proactive peace diplomacy in the international 
context, and actively collaborated with the international organizations to respond to the 
global humanitarian crises. Played as an international civilian actor, the Turkish foreign 
ministry developed systematic blueprint strategy and priorities of the national goals which 
included ‘(a) a visionary vs. crisis orientation, (b) a consistent and systematic framework, and 
(c) the use of soft power in political rhetoric and action’ (Sazak & Murphy, 2012, p. 2). 
Employing these strategies in foreign relations to realize its ambitious vision, Turkey has 
experienced foreign policy transformations from the old to the new Turkey, which allowed to 
return to the scene of global politics as a pro-active agent (Haşimi, 2014, p. 134).   
 
As civilian power actors mainly focus economy and diplomacy to deal with de-stabilized 
regions, Turkey have recognized that development and humanitarian assistances to the less 
developed regions describes the country’s best interest to advance its regional and 
international influences. To embark on this, the Turkish International Cooperation and 
Development Agency (TIKA) was officially established in 1992 to pledge a systematic 
approach for its foreign assistances (Kardaş & Erdağ, 2012, p. 167). Although TIKA’s 
original mission was to meet the immediate needs of Balkan and Eurasian countries at times 
where religion and ethnic clashes existed in that region, however, its scope has increased to 
include Middle East, Africa and Latin America for the last decade. TIKA, has now a total of 
33 coordination offices in the Balkans, Middle East, Africa, Latin America and Central Asia, 
and has development cooperation programs or projects in over 100 countries (Tomlinson, 
2013, p. 260). Turkey’s initiation of TIKA for development cooperation efforts was as a 
significant civilian instrument that allows increase and coordinate its international 
development programs (Sazak & Murphy, 2012, p. 4). According to the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC), Turkey international development budget has increased tremendously in the last 
decade. For instance Turkey’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) in 2012 reached 
US$2.5 billion, up from US$600 million in 2005, a fourfold expansion in just seven years. 
The government also has committed to reaching US$5 billion by 2015 and US$10 billion by 
2020 (Tomlinson, 2013, p. 259). In 2013, according to the Global Humanitarian Assistance 
(GHI), Turkey has come to the third position of the top five donors after US and UK by 




humanitarian crises. These initiatives were increasingly viewed as important proactive 
measures for Turkish foreign policy goals to achieve international peace and stability.  
 
As discussed in the key concepts part of the thesis, the study examines the Turkish foreign 
policy, in according to the four dimensions of the concept of civilian power context, which 
are, law politics, non-state actors, international interdependence, and ideational influences. 
First Low politics. As defined in the theory part of the thesis, states employ low politic 
instruments for all matters that are not absolutely vital to the survival of the state such as the 
economy of the country and social affairs. As a core element of civilian power actions, low 
politics is contrary to high politics, which concerns the state's survival and strict national 
security, where states will employ hard powers to survive. Using civilian power instruments, 
Turkey has come up with an initiative, that military and political intervention in conflict areas 
around the world, will not yield a lasting peace, ironically, by avoiding such political 
measures, Turkey has used low and neutral foreign policy to show a companionship 
relationship with the society of poor  other states (Sazak & Murphy, 2012, p. 4). For a long 
time since the end of the Cold War, Turkey has been avoiding to involve in foreign conflicts, 
for instance, in 2003, the Turkish Grand National Assembly voted against a government 
motion to partner with the United Nations in the Iraq war. The same, has gone to the Syrian 
conflict, where the international community asked Turkey to intervene.  
 
Although Turkey involves military operations in some parts of the world, like Afghanistan, 
however, the country has combined its civilian approach to some certain hard power 
instruments in foreign policy (Sazak & Murphy, 2012, p. 4), with the United Nations security 
Couscil’s  approval. For instance The Turkish Navy involved in 2011 Libya military 
intervention with five ships and one submarine in the NATO-led naval blockade to enforce 
the arms embargo, as the Turkish parliament approved on 24th March ( Today's Zaman, 
2011). Other foreign military interventions that Turkey involves include the war in 
Afghanistan. Turkey sent troops to Afghanistan after 2003 Istanbul Bombings, which were 
linked to Al Qaeda, however, the Turkish troops in Afghanistan are not engaged in combat 
operations. Instead, to resettle the Afghan problem, Turkey has used a new mechanism of 
relationship by increasing its civilian burden over the military power and looking a multi-
dimensional approach in resolving the war torn country. As Saban Kardas argues, Turkey 
realized that civilian actions would yield greatly in restoring peace and stability in 




all groups into the political processes, along with the utilization of civilian instruments to 
look beyond Afghan territory to include regional actors such as Pakistan (Kardaş Ş. , 2013, p. 
22).  
Due to the Arap spring and the emergence of the civil conflicts in many countries, Turkey’s 
zero problem with neighbors (low politics) has come at risk, as a new wave of militant 
Islamists emerged out in Iraq and Syria. With all the security threats and challenges that ISIS 
and destabilized  neighbor countries could pose, however, Turkey avoided to intervene the 
Syrian conflict with the military, and focused on mainly defending its territory.  On the other 
hand, Turkey’s involvement in Sub-Saharan African; a region, it enjoys socioeconomic and 
political relations, Turkey maintained to employ low politics in the region, such mutual 
cooperation, humanitarian and development aid, and improving social welfare of the 
continent. Speaking in the National Assembly of Gabon, then Prime Minister, President 
Erdogan, said: “As during the history, today when we look at Africa we’re not like the ones 
see diamonds, gold, metals and underground treasures. We see our common history. When 
we look at Africa we only see our brothers and friends”,1 to show the gesture that Turkey is 
not for the exploitation of the continent’s resource, but rather for mutual cooperation.  
Generally, Turkey’s foreign policy has maintained low politics since the end of the cold war 
and with special the ruling Justice and Development terms. Although it employed high 
politics by involving conflicts  in some parts of the world, however, the commitment of such 
policy as a main foreign policy was limited. Instead, diplomacy, economy and low politic 
means to resolve the international conflicts has dominated Turkey’s foreign policy.  
Second non-State Actors. Civil society, which plays a great role in the civilian powers, is 
significant in Turkish foreign policy, especially in the ruling Justice and Development Part 
term. Turkey has a large active civil society institutions, according to the Third Sector 
Foundation of Turkey (TUSEV), more than 93,000 associations are currently registered in 
Turkey, and 4600 are active foundations (Tomlinson, 2013, p. 262). Not only those 
institutions work merely in Turkey, but, alongside with the government, they have been 
involved in international development cooperation, for instance, ‘An estimate from 2007 puts 
the level of private donations for Turkish development cooperation at US$980 million 
(against US$714 million in ODA for that year)’. (Tomlinson, 2013, p. 265). The non-state 
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 Todays Zaman. (2013, January 08,). Turkey sees in Africa friends and brothers, not diamonds, Erdoğan says. 





actors’s influence on Turkish foreign policy has been growing for the last decade, as 
Davutoğlu’s “Turkey’s Foreign Minister from 2009 1st May 2009 – 28th August 2014” ‘total 
performance’ principle advocates to involve the civil society to the foreign policy. The 
principle promotes total inclusiveness of non-state actors like NGOs, business circles, think-
tanks, and intellectual figures in the foreign policy agenda. For that reason,  currently, Turkey 
employs a ‘multi-track diplomacy’ to pursue a more a proactive foreign policy, unlike  
previous terms, where, the Turkish state was the sole primary actor in the country’s foreign 
policy.  Davutoğlu’s total performance principle aimed to incorporate non-state actors in a 
unified foreign policy strategy with emphasis to reach a common international objective. 
With this great foreign policy transformation, Turkey, have become more visible because of 
the activities of these non-state actors. Mainly, Turkey’s non-state actors employ education, 
humanitarian and economic means to their international influence.   This policy of total 
performance can be visibly seen in the Sub Saharan African region, where hundreds of 
Turkish civil society groups get involved along the Turkish state agencies.  In the Somali 
case, the collaboration between the Turkish NGOs and government organization in the state 
building was absolutely successful as it was a new practice in Turkish foreign policy, 
according to Mehmet Ozcan (Özkan, 2014, p. 12).  
Third  International Interdependence. Since its founding, Turkey has been pursuing an 
interdependence foreign policy approach. While there had been security dilemmas in the 
Cold War era, however Turkey’s integration and interdependence with  the EU has been 
growing. For instance, Turkey’s signing of the Custom Union and the opening of accession 
process has been signs of its integration and interdependence with EU countries. On the other 
hand, since the end of the Cold War, Turkey’s integration and interdependence with other 
regions other than Europe, has been growing dramatically. As the Soviet threats disappeared, 
Turkey has initiated multiple regional connections, starting with the Balkans, the Caucasus 
and the Middle East (Tomlinson, 2013, p. 259), and created economic relations with Russia, a 
hub for energy distribution. Another policy of Turkey’s integration and interdependence 
foreign policy is the zero problems towards neighbors. Despite the Arab spring 
counterproductive results, Turkey’s relations with its neighbors follow a more interdependent 
and integrative track as there have been economic interdependence between Turkey and its 
neighboring countries.  Moreover, with then Prime Minister Erdogan’s visit to Ethiopia and 





Fourth  ideational influences. Another important dimension of the concept of civilian power 
is the ideational influence in the foreign policy making, which can be christened to the actors’ 
understanding and interpretation of the international system.  Civilian powers emphasis on 
shared ideas to influence the international systems. This practice is significantly different 
from those of the material explanation in construing the international relations, which is 
based on the objective distribution of tangible power, while aspirations, beliefs, and other 
ideas are not considered as relevant variables.’ (Fangyin, 2007, p. 449). Unlike the realist 
thinking during the Cold War, and the necessary of materialism in its foreign policy, The 
Turkish foreign policy after the cold war has transformed dramatically. Given to the 
Davutoglu’s strategic depth, and the rapprochement to the EU, which necessitates to adhere 
its basic principles and concepts, the Turkish foreign policy has transformed from security 
centric foreign policy to desecuritizing actor and the role of ideational influence has been 












3. BACKGROUND OF SOMALIA STATE BUILDING & THE 
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY’S SUPPORT 
3.1. Introduction  
 
The modern statehood of Somalia starts with the country’s independence from Britain and 
Italy in 1960. The first government led by the first elected Somalia President Adan Osman, 
constituted civilian democratic government.  Osman steps down in 1967, becoming the first 
African president to hand over the power after being defeated in the general elections. During 
the civilian administration that existed prior to the seizure of power by the Supreme 
Revolutionary Council (SRC) in 1969, Somalia was touted in the West as a model of a 
successful democracy in Africa, as peaceful successful elections had been held (Ewusi & 
Akwanga, 2010, p. 81). However, the Siad Barre-led Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC), 
suspended the constitution, dissolved the parliament, the Supreme Court, and all the political 
parties (Ismail, 2010, p. 85). After 20 years of military rule and dictatorship, Barre's Supreme 
Revolutionary Council was eventually forced out in the early 1990s by a coalition of armed 
opposition groups. As a result of a devastating civil war followed the state collapse in 1991, 
which triggered the ruin of state institutions, Somalia has lacked a fully functioning 
government for the last two decades. Several efforts to salvage the country have been made 
by the international community by working closely with the neighboring countries to restore 
peace and stability in the country. In the following sections, the study presents the 
international community’s support to Somalia’s peace building and political reconciliation 
since the state collapse.  
3. 2. Peace Building Support 
 
Soon after ouster of Siad Barre regime, the first international intervention authorized by the 
UN Security Council, was the ‘United Nations Operation in Somalia’ or known as UNOSOM 
I, which started in 24th April 1992,  to monitor the ceasefire in Mogadishu; and protect UN 
humanitarian workers  in Somalia (UN, 2003b). As the situation on the ground deteriorated, 
the mission was replaced with a US led Unified Task Force (UNITAF), also known as the 
operation of ‘Restore Hope’, which had the mandate from the UNSC to use all the necessary 
means to protect the humanitarian convoys, humanitarian assistance centers and other peace-
enforcement operations (UN, 2003b).  On March 1993 the UNSC decided, under the 




operation -- UNOSOM II with 28,000 military and civilian police personnel (United Nations, 
2003a) to expand the mission throughout the country. The new mission’s mandate included: 
preventing the violence and taking appropriate action if necessary; maintaining control of 
heavy weapons, seizing the small arms, and securing all ports, airports and lines of 
communications of the country to restore peace, stability, and the law and order (United 
Nations, 2003a). The operation failed due to intense battle with the some factions of 
Somalia’s warlords and fetched up with the complete withdrawal of the United Nations 
forces from Somalia in early March 1995.  
As the United Nations’ forces left behind, while the civil war continued, a new religiously 
motivated Islamist organizations emerged out in the country whose aim was to establish a 
sharia ruled state in Somalia. In 2006 a coalition of Islamic courts had seized control of 
southern and central Somalia in an attempt to expand their power throughout the country. 
However, as part of its global counter terrorism war, the United States backed up at least 
15,000 Ethiopian forces (Lone, 2006) to assault and overthrow the Islamists. Amid to the 
historical hostility between Ethiopian and Somalis, the Ethiopians couldn’t stay long in the 
country, and African Mission was replaced. The African Union Mission in Somalia 
(AMISOM) was created by African Union’s Peace and Security Council on 19th January 
2007 and authorized by the UN Security Council On 20th February 2007 with the mandate to 
support the Somalia Federal government build its institutions and taking all necessary means 
to fight against the Al Shabab threat in coordination with Somalia National forces 
(AMISOM). The 22,126 uniformed AMISOM personnel (both troops and police), which 
contributed by ten African countries, including Uganda, Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia, 
Sierra Leone, Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria and Zimbabwe, have been in Somalia since 2007 
(AMISOM), for peace and state building objective, however, the mission hasn’t yet succeed 
to defeat al Shabab.  
3. 3. Political Reconciliation Support 
 
Starting from the state collapse in 1991, the international community has organized many 
reconciliation conferences to mediate between the conflicting parties in Somalia. Djibouti; a 
neighboring Somali ethnic majority, organized the first reconciliation conference for six 
Somali factions in June-July 1991 (Interpeace & Center for Research and Dialogue, 2009, p. 




Mahdi, to be the Somali president to lead the country, however, soon General Muhammad 
Farah Aided; who played a great role in the overthrow of the military regime, rejected the 
agreement which led to deepening the civil war in Mogadishu and south central Somalia. As 
the Djibouti agreement failed due to the many factional group’s boycott, the United Nations 
organized another wider conference participated by 15 parties in Ethiopia in March 1993 
(Interpeace & Center for Research and Dialogue, 2009, p. 10). The parties agreed on 
disarmament and national reconciliation, however, as the United Nations troops withdrew 
from Somalia in 1995 due to the intense battle with Mohamed Aidid’s faction, the agreement 
fall apart.  
As the United Nations’ role in Somalia ended in 1995, the attempts to mediate the conflicting 
parties continued by the neighboring regional countries. Between 1996 and 1997, the 
Ethiopian government organized a conference in Sodere participated by 26 factional groups. 
A National Salvation council was formed to prepare a further National Reconciliation 
Conference in Bosasso, Somalia, in which to establish a transitional government.  Yet again 
the Sodera outcome didn’t make it to salvage the country as some of the key warlords already 
boycotted to participate the conference (Interpeace & Center for Research and Dialogue, 
2009, p. 14). 
Although, Somalia has a historical and cultural ties with the Arabian Peninsula, and have 
been a member of the Arab League since 1974, however, the role of the Arabs and the 
Muslim world to mediate the Somalis was minimal especially until lately.  Yemen started the 
first Arab initiative to mediate between some of the groups in May 1997, however, a much 
broader conference was hosted by Egypt; an important regional Arab state, to include 28 
groups, in which as a result a “Cairo Declaration on Somalia” was signed by 13-person 
Council (UN Peaceaker, 1997), to hold a broader national conference in Baidoa, Somalia on 
February 1998.  
In about eight years without a central government and unsuccessful reconciliations, Djibouti 
started to organize a series of meetings between April and May 2000.  Unlike the previous 
attempts, the civil society organization, including intellectuals, religious leaders and the 
business community (Interpeace & Center for Research and Dialogue, 2009, p. 15), were 
given a voice in the Djibouti peace initiative and the first transitional government since 1991 
was founded. Since the Djibouti peace process was supported by Egypt; an Ethiopia rivalry in 




suggest that the neighboring countries, especially Ethiopian was accused to support an 
opposing alliance of military factions, against the Transitional National government instituted 
in Djibouti. In an attempt to reconcile between the Djibouti-backed TNG and the Ethiopian-
backed Somali Restoration and Reconciliation Council (SRRC), the Intergovernmental 
Authority on Development (IGAD) started an initiative to reach a comprehensive political 
settlement. Supported by the Arab League, African Union and the United Nations, the 
initiative eventually developed into a broad IGAD led Somali National Reconciliation 
Conference which lasted for two consecutive years in Kenya. As the TNG’s mandate was 
ending in 2004, The Conference was successfully concluded with the formation of a new 
Transitional Federal Charter, new federal parliament and Abdullahi Yusuf as the new 
president in October 2004 for a five year transitional period. 
Generally, although the international community has made serious efforts for the last twenty 
years in Somalia’s state building and has made some relative progress, however, these actions 
have not yet yielded a united Somalia under effective central government. The country is still 
an example of state failure and one of the most violent countries or the number one as Armed 
















4. BACKGROUND OF TURKEY-SOMALIA RELATIONS 
4. 1. Introduction  
 
The historical relations between Somalia and Turkey went through different periods, starting 
from the Ottoman time to the Somalia’s moderns ages of independence, to the state collapse 
and 2011 humanitarians crises in the horn of Africa. Briefly, in the following sections, the 
study divides the history into two main sections. First: historical ties of Turkey-Somalia 
relations, and second: post 2011 period; the growing relations of the two countries.  
4.2. Historical ties: Pre- & Modern day 
 
The historical relations linking Somalia and Turkey dates back to the Middle Ages, when the 
Ottomans arrived to the Horn of Africa to support Somalis’ fight with Ethiopia and 
Portuguese expeditionary forces (Lewis, 2002, p. 26).  Ethiopian and Portugues allied to 
expand their influence in the region, including the Somali territories (Kagwanja, 2013, p. 2). 
Somalia, which was then ruled by small empires, was at a critical time when the Ottomans 
came to support the local sultans who was mainly controlling Somalia’s coastal towns in 
fighting against the Ethiopia- Portugal aggressors. The Ottomans supported the indigenous 
Somali people with military training and equipment to counter balance the foreign and 
regional powers in the continent.   
 
The modern history of Somalia-Turkey relation starts with the engagement of both countries 
in diplomatic missions, as Somalia opened its embassy in Ankara in 1979, (International 
Crises Group, 2012, p. 2), and Turkey also opened its embassy in Mogadishu the same year 
in 1979 (Kagwanja, 2013, str. 2).  Since that, both countries cooperated in many areas, for 
instance, Somalia’s was on a list of African countries benefited from Turkey’ first official 
development program for institutional capacity building in 1985 (İpek, 2014, p. 415). The 
two countries also were among the founding members of the Organization of Islamic 
Cooperation (OIC) in 1969.   
 
With the collapse of the Somali government in 1991, Turkey was an active member of the 
first of international coalition sent troops to Somalia, to restore peace and stability in the 
country. Lieutenant General Çevik Bir, a Turkish military official, was appointed as the force 




2012, p. 2), to lead 28,000 military and civilian personnel from 34 countries2 between April 
1993 - January 1994 (United Nations, 2003a). However, as the operation did not yield a 
lasting peace in Somalia, the UN withdrew from the country in March 1995 as the situation 
worsened. Since then, as Somalia had been in a civil war, the international engagement in the 
country was limited to outside remotely guided humanitarian assistance. Likewise, the 
Turkey’s involvement in the country was also minimal, apart from some unofficial meetings 
between Turkish and Somalia leaders. For instance, Participating the 29-30 January 2007 
African Union (AU) summit in Addis Ababa, Prime Minister Erdogan met with President 
Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia. As they 
discussed the situation of the country, Erdogan invited the TFG leadership to visit Ankara 
and propose their immediate needs, however the initiative wasn’t followed up further by the 
TFG, according to the International Crises Group (International Crises Group, 2012, p. 3).  In 
September 2009, then Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan met with the Somalia Prime Minister 
at the 64th  UN General Assembly, (İpek, 2014, p. 419), to discuss the Somalia’s state 
building process. Moreover, then Prime Minister, President Erdogan’s visit to Somalia in 
2011, president Sharif of Somalia visited Ankara several times and the Turkish government 
hosted a high level International conference on Somalia in Istanbul from 21-23 May, 2010 
focusing on the determination of the United Nations, the Government of Turkey and the 
International Community to support the state and peace building of the Somalia political 
process (Istanbul Conference on Somalia, 2010, p. 1).  
4.3. Post 2011 Period: Growing Turkey-Somalia Relations 
 
Somalia and East African countries generally had faced a terrifying drought in 2011, which 
caused hundreds of people to die and millions to flee as severe food shortages hit the region, 
which was said ‘the worst drought in sixty years’, (BBC, 2011a), due to deficiency of rain 
falls in subsequent years. In response to the humanitarian tragedy, then Prime Minister 
Erdogan, led a delegation comprised more than 200 political, business and cultural elites to 
Somalia together with his family in August 2011 (International Crises Group, 2012, p. 3). 
Mogadishu, which was once called by the international media ‘the most dangerous city’ in 
the world, had experienced the biggest foreign delegation, the city ever received in more than 
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two decades. Despite the incessant warnings from some of the western countries to their 
citizens from traveling to Somalia owing to the security threats in Mogadishu, Erdogan 
stormed the international community in daring to take a lead and bringing together some of 
the key ministers of his cabinet, civil society and state institutions to Somalia. Along with 
some key leaders of the ruling Justice and Development Party, the cardinal ministers of 
Erdogan’s delegation to Mogadishu included the foreign minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, deputy 
prime minister Bekir Bozdağ, Family and Social Policy Minister Fatma Şahin, Health 
Minister Recep Akdağ, Food, Agriculture and Livestock Minister Mehdi Eker (SABAH, 
2011). As that was Erdogan’s strategy to draw the global attention to Somalia, he also 
included some of the well-known public figures in his delegation to turn the Turkish attention 
on Somalia, and here are included: entertainment artists, like Sertab Erener, Nihat Dogan, 
Ajda Pekkan, Muazzez Ersoy, and prominent businessmen such as the President of TÜSIAD, 
Ümit Boyner, and the President of ASO, Nurettin Özdebir (Özkan, 2014, p. 22). Speaking in 
Mogadishu, in a press conference with President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, Erdogan called all 
Turkish Public institutions and NGOs to support Somalia.  
 
Figure 1.Then Somali and Turkish presidents in Turkey,  in 2012. 
Since Erdogan’s visit to Somalia, the relation of both countries has grown and intensified, as 
Turkey has been widely lobbying in the international community to support Somalia stand its 
feet after years of conflict and isolation. Before visiting to Somalia, Erdogan called an 
emergency meeting for the OIC member in Istanbul to help assist the Somalia’s droughts and 
famine. Following the meeting, the OIC members pledged $350m and agreed to form a task 
force team composed of Kazakhstan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Senegal and the OIC Secretariat-




2011, about a month after his Mogadishu visit, speaking at the UN General Assembly, 
Erdogan allocated half of his speech to Somalia, urged the international community to 
support Somalia end the conflict (International Crises Group, 2012, p. 3).  
4.4. Turkey’s 2011 Emergence Humanitarian Campaign in Somalia 
 
The first two years after Erdogan’s visit to Mogadishu, most of the Turkish operations in 
Somalia focused on addressing merely the emergence humanitarian needs, up until, the 
United Nations officially declared the end of the Somalia’s famine crises (VOA, 2012a). 
During that period, the Turkish government had sent $200 million worthy humanitarian aid to 
Somalia. Together with the Turkish society’s donation for Somalia, collected by local NGOs, 
Turkish support to Somalia had reached 350 million dollars (İpek, 2014, p. 412). According 
to the Official Development Assistance (ODA), a total of 93.390.664 Million dollars (Turkish 
Development and Coordination Agency, 2011a, p. 87) worthy humanitarian aid were sent to 
Somalia in 2011 alone to respond to the famine crises.  In 2012, as the emergency situation 
significantly dropped, due to the massive international aid to Somalia, Turkey, with all of its 
public entities as well as NGOs, delivered 47.54 million USD public aid in 2012 (Turkish 
Cooperation and Coordination Agency, 2012d, p. 57) 
 
The Turkish humanitarian and development operation in Somalia entail the alignment and 
cooperation of many actors. While the government and its public institutions took the utmost 
responsibility, however, there are about a dozen non-governmental humanitarian 
organizations working in Somalia. Generally, the Turkish actors in Somalia can be 
categorized into two broad sections: State institutions, and Private institutions. First: the state 
institutions, constitute government bodies such as ministries, municipalities, and government 
agencies such as TIKA, AFAD and Kizilay (Turkish Red Crescent).  Second: Private 
institutions comprise non-governmental organizations, including IHH, Kimse Yok Mu, And 
many more. TIKA is the focal point of all humanitarian and development operations 
undertaken by all Turkish organizations in Somalia by organizing and coordinating the 






 4.4.1. Turkey’s State Institutions’ humanitarian campaign in Somalia 
 
Turkey’s public institutions have played a great role in the improving humanitarian situation 
in Somalia.  About 30% of the Turkey’s international emergency assistance provided by 
public institutions was turned towards Somalia in 2011 (Turkish Development and 
Coordination Agency, 2011, p. 11). With 12 cargo planes and eight ships fully loaded with 
aid supplies (Turkish Development and Coordination Agency, 2011a, p. 48), the assignment 
of 143 doctors and health staff in Somalia, medical examinations for 70,786 people (Turkish 
Development and Coordination Agency, 2011a, p. 48), in 2011, Somalia was the largest aid 
recipient from the Turkish public institutions.  
 
 
Figure 2 Countries received the most aid from Turkey’s Public Institutions in 2011 
Source: Directorate of Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency, 2011Annual report 
 
In the following sections, the study discusses in detail the efforts and activities of each of 
Turkey’ public institutions to respond to Somalia’s 2011 humanitarian tragedy.   First: 
Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency or known as (AFAD), greatly focuses on 
emergency responses,  was one of the leading Turkish organizations in Somalia, especially in 
the first year of the 2011 humanitarian crises. According to AFAD’s 2011 annual report, the 
organization has sent 22,128-ton of humanitarian aid that cost 92.690.000 TL with 16 aircraft 
and 8 ships (Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD), 2011a, p. 45), to 
Somalia just in the first year of its operation in the country. AFAD also brought 57 severely 




(AFAD), 2011a, p. 45) who, due to the lack of good quality health services, wasn’t possible 
to hospitalize in the country. 
  
AFAD activities in Somalia in the following years after 2011 could be categorized as 
delivering humanitarian needs such food and clean water, and proving health services in 
established field hospitals. In its solitary, and sometimes in coordination with the Somalian 
Ministry of Health, Turkish Ministry of Health, TRC, TIKA, The Turkish Police, and various 
other NGOs, AFAD has sent a total of 149 ton and 6,493,553 kg humanitarian aid to Somalia 
in separate dates; March 5th, May 1st and 26th, (Disaster and Emergency Management 
Presidency (AFAD), 2012b, p. 74) and 24th December of 2012 (Disaster and Emergency 
Management Presidency (AFAD), 2012b, p. 76). According to AFAD’s 2012 annual report, a 
total of 80 tons of medicine and medical supplies was sent to Somalia in February 9th 
(Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD), 2012b, p. 73) and 28th, (Disaster 
and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD), 2012b, p. 74) of 2012 and a total of 
19,862,439.74 TL (Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD), 2012b, p. 77)  
has been allocated for a 200-bed hospital to be built in Mogadishu, and 5 ambulances were 
sent to Somalia to be used in the field hospitals in Mogadishu for emergence referral 
(Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD), 2012b, p. 77).  In addition, in 
2012, AFAD has also supported the evacuation of the severely wounded Somalis in 
Mogadishu suicide attacks to Turkey for treatment. With the support of Turkish Chief of 
Staff, AFAD brought 32 Somalis wounded in bomb attack in Mogadishu and their companion 
in two separate planes to Turkey for treatment on Feb. 13 and 14 of the year (Disaster and 
Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD), 2012b, p. 73).  As the emergency 
humanitarian situation of the country improved, AFAD operation in the years after 2012 
diminished but still active in Somalia. In 2013, AFAD spent 139 million TL in 11,000 tons of 
humanitarian aid sent by ship to Somalia (Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency 
(AFAD), 2013c, p. 157). 
 
Second: The Turkish Red Crescent, known as Kızılay has done enormous humanitarian and 
development projects throughout Somalia by cooperating with the Somali ministry of 
interior, and the other Turkish and international humanitarian bodies in the ground. TRC 
delegation had arrived Somalia in August 11, 2011 (Turkish Red Crescent, 2015, p. 5), and 
soon set up Jazeera Hayat camp for 2,500 IDPs, which later expanded to host over 10,000 




covered bazaar and playground for the youth (Turkish Red Crescent, 2015, p. 8). By 
managing that Camp; which is the largest and most visible IDP camp in Mogadishu, TRC 
have been providing all the necessary facilities for life. According to the recent report 
published in January 2015, TRC has produced and distributed 12,180,000 breads in merely 
Jazeera Camp between November 2011 and December 2014, and a number of 170,665,605 
hot meals for hospitals, schools, disabled and orphanage houses in Somalia 
(Turkish Red Crescent, 2015, p. 10). Generally, TRC has sent and distributed approximately 
50,000 tons of relief materials via air transport and 18 shipments between 8th August 2011 
and 31st 2014 (Turkish Red Crescent, 2015, p. 11). According to the Turkish State Audit 
Board’s inspection report, the Turkish Red Crescent has spent a total of 29,551,757 Turkish 
lira, between 2010 and 2012 in Somalia (Turkish State Audit Board, 2014, p. 921) for 
emergence humanitarian assistance.  
 
Third: the Turkish Ministry of Religious Affairs, also known as Diyanet, is among other 
government bodies working in Somalia humanitarian operation campaign. The Diyanet in 
collaboration with the Religious Foundation of Turkey has implemented several humanitarian 
activities in Somalia in the early period of the drought and famine. According to the 
ministry’s official online site, the foundation had sent by air and sea and distributed over 7 
thousand tons of emergency humanitarian relief materials (Turkish Ministry of Religious 
Affairs, 2011), and distributed holy Koran in several mosques across Somalia. Fourth: The 
Turkish Ministry of Health, unlike other humanitarian bodies, had focused merely on health 
service assistance to the needy people. During the emergency period, the ministry has sent 
tens of health personnel, and tons of medicine to Somalia. According to its annual report, 
between 2011 and 2012, the Ministry has sent a total of 265 health personnel comprised 72 
physicians, 3 pharmacists, 174 assistant health personnel, 6 technicians and 10 cooks, and 5 
emergency ambulances for referral services (Turkish Ministery of Health, 2012, p. 112) to 
work on the emergency situation that existed in the country. According to that report, a total 
of 263, 380 patients was examined, and 1,928 surgeries were performed, (Turkish Ministery 
of Health, 2012, p. 112). In addition, the ministry has also trained the young Somalia health 
personnel, both in Somalia and Turkey. According to the report, 16 Somalia health personnel 
were given education and practical training in Turkey in the year of 2012 (Turkish Ministery 





Fifth: TIKA, which has been coordinating the operations of all Turkish humanitarian 
organizations, has focused mainly on development projects such as education, health, state 
capacity building, and some minor humanitarian operations. The study will present TIKA’s 
activities in the development section of the subsequent part, but in general, Somalia was the 
biggest assistance recipient of TIKA international development operations in the year of 2012 
by taking 30.46% of TIKA’s expenses (TIKA, 2012b, p. 24) and 10.7% of the year of 2013 
(TIKA, 2013c, p. 20). As many Turkish organizations focused delivering humanitarian relief, 
TIKA focused on drilling wells to secure clean water sources for the internally displaced 
people. A total of 19 water wells has been constructed in Mogadishu outskirts and 35 new 
were planned to drill in northern Somalia by TIKA, according to 2013 annual report (TIKA, 
2013c, p. 164) 
 
4.4.1. Turkey’s Non-state Actor’s humanitarian campaign in Somalia 
 
The Turkish private institutions, which this study means NGOs, played a great role in the 
2011 humanitarian crises, and Somalia was the largest aid recipient from the Turkish NGOs 
in 2011 due to famine crises,  
 
 
Figure 3 Countries received the most aid from Turkish NGO in 2011 
(Source: Directorate of Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency, 2011 report). 
 
There are many Turkish NGOs involved in Somalia, working in different humanitarian 
aspects such as emergence health assistance, livelihood, and water and sanitation. In the 




active Turkish NGOs in improving Somalia’s humanitarian situation. First: Humanitarian 
Relief Foundation, also known as IHH. Unlike any other Turkish NGO, IHH started working 
in Somalia fifteen years ago, in cooperation with local Somali partners. In its first 2011 
humanitarian campaign in Somalia, IHH in collaboration with Qatar Red Crescent IHH sent 
10,000 tons of humanitarian aid to Somalia (International Crises Group, 2012, p. 4). The 
organization constructed 340 water wells to serve for the needy people (Turkish Development 
and Coordination Agency, 2011a). In the post emergence period, IHH relocated 1,500 
internally displaced families to their home towns, sponsored 3,100 orphans, and provided free 
cataract eye surgery for about 10,000 people (International Crises Group, 2012, p. 4). 
 
Second: Kimse Yok Mu (KYM, “Is Anybody Out There”), is also an active humanitarian 
organization in Somalia. Initially, the organization sent about 23 tons of emergency aid, 
(International Crises Group, 2012, p. 4), to the country and distributed to the needy people. 
KYM sent also a total of 15 doctors to Somalia to assist the needy people. The organization 
also provided directly or through partners, 100 wheelchairs, 1,400 Meals for prisoners, 
vocational training for 30 women (International Crises Group, 2012, p. 4). Third: Doctors 
Worldwide (Yeryüzü Doktorlar), as the meaning of the name gives laterally, Doctors 
Worldwide, mainly focus on merely medical support to the needy people. In Somalia the 
organization constructed 62 bed Shifa Hospital in Mogadishu for emergence medical support. 
With 73 staff the hospital conducts 500 clinical examination, 20 births and 10 surgeries on a 
daily basis. In 2011 alone the organization transported 143,135 boxes medical supplies 
(Turkish Development and Coordination Agency, 2011a, p. 72), and 2 ambulances (2012)’ 
(Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency, 2012d, p. 83), to Somalia. To assist the 
other hospitals in the city, Doctors worldwide assigned 27 health workers to Banaadir 
Hospital, in which they conducted 3,000 medical examinations and 65 surgeries in November 
of 2011, and also brought 13 Somali health workers to Turkey for training (Turkish 
Development and Coordination Agency, 2011a, p. 72).   
4.5. Somalia in the context of Turkey’s foreign policy’s vision  
 
Over the last decades, Turkey has pursued a multidimensional active foreign policy to reach 
new geographies, in which its presence and influence had been minimal in the past. In the 
new foreign policy vision, Turkey has actively engaged, for instance, in the Middle Eastern 




policy. In line with this multidimensional approach, Turkey has also reached and actively 
involved in Africa as part of its 1998 Africa initiative. The number of Turkish embassies in 
Africa  has raised from 12 in 2005, to 31 in 2011 (Davutoğlu, 2012, p. 3),  including its 
embassy in Somalia, which was only re-opened in 2011, after two decades of civil war. 
Turkey’s re engagement in Somalia is part of Turkey’s broader African policy, which goes 
back to its 1998 ‘Opening to Africa Action Plan’ scheme, to improve the political, economic, 
development, and cultural relations with the continent (Bilgic & Nascimento, 2014, p. 1). 
From 1998 to 2005 period, Turkey built the infrastructure and diplomatic presence in the 
continent as a threshold of its broader African policy.  The relations intensified as Turkey 
increased its presence and engagement with the continent, for instance, In 2005 Turkey 
declared ‘Year of Africa’, to upgrade its presence in the continent, and then Prime Minister 
Erdogan visited Ethiopia and South Africa to become ‘the first prime minister of the Turkish 
republican era to officially visit a state below the equator’ (Özkan, 2010, p. 95). As the 
relations intensified, Turkey obtained observer status at the African Union (Bilgic & 
Nascimento, 2014, p. 1), and African development Bank in the subsequent years (Özkan, 
2014, p. 18), to be a new emerging donor for the continent. Moreover, Turkey organized first 
‘Turkey-Africa Cooperation Summit’ in Istanbul between 18-21 August 2008, and the second 
‘Turkey-Africa Partnership Summit’ which was held in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea between 
19-21 November 2014, as a sign of Africa’s increasing importance in the Turkish foreign 
policy, as a result of the growing cooperation. Accordingly, Turkey’s development and 
humanitarian assistance, and Turkish none state actors activism in the continent has been 





Figure 4 Turkish & Somalia Presidents Erdogan and Sheikh Mohamud in Mogadishu, January 2015. 
 
Turkey’s humanitarian response to the 2011 East African famine crises and the visit of then 
Turkey’s Prime Ministry to Somalia with his family, represents a turning point of Turkey-
African relations, as Turkey further engaged in the continent’s internal chronic problems. In 
this context, Turkey invested millions of economic and humanitarian aid to the war torn horn 
of African country, to alleviate the humanitarian tragedies, and support state building and 
stabilization activities in Somalia. According to Mehmet Ozkan, Turkey’s involvement in 
Somalia will represent the capacity of Turkey’s foreign policy impact to deal with the 
continent’s internal problems, and the success or failure of the Somalia policy will be a 
‘litmus’ for Turkey’s future relation with Africa (Özkan, 2014, p. 11).  
 
Another way that Somalia, is in the context of Turkey’s foreign policy, is the Turkey’s 
relations with the Least Developed Countries (LDC). Turkey’s relationship to the LDCs  
involves a commitment of ten years,  which was  initiated by a UN Conference of 
Governments  in Istanbul  between May 9-13, 2011, and attended by 192 governments, 60 
head of states, more than 100 ministers, 47 international organizations, and 10,000 
participants (Davutoğlu, 2012, p. 5). The Istanbul Program of Action for least developed 
countries stressed economic investment, technology transfer, support for agriculture, 
education, health, and food security (Davutoğlu, 2012, p. 7). Beside these UN programs and 




part of its challenge in acting on behalf of these LDCs will be to get as many countries as 
possible out of the LDC classification (Davutoğlu, 2012, p. 4). Somalia, which is one of the 
least developed countries, Turkey has not only showed solidarity and support, but also raised 
consciousness in the global setting (Davutoğlu, 2012, p. 4), to increase and coordinate the 
















5. TURKEY’S ROLE IN SOMALIA STATE BUILDING 
5.1. Introduction  
 
Turkey’s involvement in Somalia started with response to the 2011 humanitarian crises that 
threaten the East African countries generally and with special focus to Somalia.  However, as 
a result of twenty years of political crises and civil war, Turkey realized the root cause of the 
drought and famine was the ineffectiveness of the state to respond to the social needs. A 
combination of Turkish state and civil society organizations has launched broad range 
activities of state capacity building, economic infrastructure and social service development. 
Today, Turkey’s massive economic investment in the country, bilateral cooperation 
agreements, its mediation role in the political rivalries, and its involvement in peace and state 
building activities, Turkey’s Somalia policy enters a new phase broader than its 2011 
humanitarian intervention. In the following section, the study discuses and present Turkey’s 
state building activism in Somalia. 
5.2. Turkey’s civilian power approach to Somalia state building process  
 
With the collapse of the Somali government in 1991, Turkey was an active member of the 
first international coalition sent troops to Somalia, to restore stability in the country. 
Lieutenant General Çevik Bir, a Turkish military commander, was appointed as the force 
commander of the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) II, (International Crises Group, 
2012, p. 2), to lead 28,000 military and civilian police personnel from 34 countries3 between 
April 1993 - January 1994, (United Nations, 2003), however, as the operation did not yield a 
lasting peace in Somalia, Turkey along with the United Nations troops withdrew from the 
country in March 1995,  as the situation worsened. Turkey’s first attempt to rebuild the 
Somalia state failed as the mission, along with other international partners heavily relied on 
military power to resolve the political problems which divided Somalia’s factional groups. 
Although,  the United Nations’ mission made attempts to use a civilian power approach to 
mediate between the political rivalries, however the mission finally failed in the Mogadishu 
Battle (1993), as it had merely relied on foreign troops to secure the country, (Yoo, 2011, p. 
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14). The second attempt of Turkey’s involvement in the Somalia was its 2011 response to the 
humanitarian crises that  hit the Horn of African region. Although the 2011 intervention was 
mainly motivated by humanitarian morality, however, Turkey’s post-2011 strategy to rebuild 
the Somali state was quite unlikely to its 1992 approaches.  Instead by using diplomacy to 
mediate, humanitarian and development assistance to all parts, building the state through 
infrastructure and institutional development, Turkey undertook a civilian power policy 
instrument to avoid involving in the conflict.  
Turkey’s foreign policy to post-conflict countries since the early 2000s, has seemed to have 
shifted radically from military missions to a civilian power approach assistance, (Sazak & 
Murphy, 2012, p. 1), so that of the Somalia case. Explaining the new Turkish foreign policy 
in Somalia, then foreign minister Davutoglu emphasized the significance of the civilian 
power approach to Somali state building and stabilization process, while also recalling the 
international community’s unsuccessful past efforts. Ahmet Davutoglu remarked at London 
conference on Somalia: 
“During the last twenty years of Somalia, numerous initiatives have been taken,[…] 
several international and regional peacekeeping forces have been deployed, and 
foreign military intervention has been carried out, now, it is high time to make 
reassessment, and to develop an integrated strategy based on three pillars. First 
humanitarian assistance, development and reconstruction, second, improving security 
and establishing public order and third, a political process leading to an inclusive 
democratic government”.4  
Unlike  foreign militaries, Turkey vowed to support and the build the Somalia security 
services  to establish an enduring success against the rebels and terrorist organizations. 
Emphasizing on this Davutoglu said at a London conference on Somalia: “Somali led public 
order based on sovereignty of Somalia, should be the basic principle of security”.
5 In this 
regard, Turkey trains the Somalia security services both in Somalia and Turkey, and also 
builds the infrastructures of the Somali security institutions in the country. 
Despite the security challenges, Turkey works out from Mogadishu unlike other international 
partners due to the security pressures, and works to rebuild the state institutions, economic 
infrastructures, and social service development. The Somalia President Hassan Sheikh 
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Mohamud  praised the Turkish involvement and activities in Somalia as a model  to other 
donors, saying:  
“The Turkish model in Somalia is very, very clear… They said we want to do this 
thing in Somalia, and they do it. They are there. They come there, starting from their 
top leadership, the prime minister of the country with his family, the rest, deputy 
prime minister, ministries. There is a deputy prime minister who comes to Somalia 
every other month just to monitor and see how the projects are going on. They are 
building or implementing projects that are really tangible ones… They are doing the 
work there. […]. They are doing the same thing – they started doing the same thing in 
Puntland and Somaliland, [northern regions of Somalia]..” (Haşimi, 2014, p. 128). 
This proactive policy has also created the international community’s relocation in Somalia, as 
several western and Arab embassies opened their embassies in Mogadishu. According to 
Mehmet Ozkan (Özkan, 2014), this policy toward Somalia has been unique in its foreign 
policy, as Turkey involved in state building activities, in a continent, in which Turkey 
penetrated recently. For Ozkan, Turkey’s success in Somalia’s state building and stabilization 
process will be closely tied to its future relation to the African continent (Özkan, 2014, p. 11). 
For that reason, Turkey’s foreign policy in Somalia, has been important in its broader African 
policy. Then Foreign Minster Ahmet Davutoglu, clarified Turkey’s strategic vision in 
Somalia by saying: “Our destiny is tied to the destiny of the Somali people … this is a 
strategic choice”,6 (International Crises Group, 2012, p. 3). In the following sections, the 
study, categorizes Turkey’s Somalia state building into five main sections: Peace building 
support, Political process support, enhancing the capacity of state institutions, developing 
economic infrastructures and social services. The study discuses each of these activities in 
detail.  
5.3. Political Process Support  
 
Since the United Nation’s complete withdrawal from Somalia in 1995, Somalia has been in 
chaos and lawlessness with no effective central government to rule the whole country. Clan 
and religious motivated wars, factional groups, and autonomous regions were all the outcome 
of political and leadership rivalry among the conflicted groups. For over twenty years, many 
regional and international efforts to stabilize the country have ended up without yielding a 
                                                 




lasting solution, except ineffective transitional governments established outside the country.  
Since then, Somalia, has been regarded as no go zone due to the security risks, however, then 
Prime Minister Erdogan of Turkey, led a delegation comprised more than 200 political, 
business and cultural elites to Somalia together with his family in August 2011, to respond 
not only to the humanitarian tragedy but also to focus the international attention to Somalia. 
Despite the incessant warnings from some of the western countries to their citizens from 
traveling to Somalia owing to the security risks in Mogadishu, Erdogan stormed the 
international community in daring to take a lead and bringing together some key ministers of 
his cabinet, civil society and state institutions to Somalia. Erdogan as Turkey’s president 
visited Somalia again in the early of this 2015 year, as another major boost for Somalia’s 
international profile.  Erdogan and other Turkey’s top official’s visit to Somalia in the last 
subsequent years, have not only set a glimpse of hope for the Somalia people, but also has 
created the international attention on Somalia. The number of foreign dignities visiting the 
country, and the number of western, Arab and African embassies relocating in the country 
has increased steadily.  By constructing one of Turkey’s biggest embassies in Mogadishu, the 
Turkish president called the international community to show solidarity with the Somalia 
people. Speaking in Mogadishu earlier this year, Erdogan said, “we invite the international 
community to strengthen its ties with Somalia”, 7 
 
Although, Somalia is now slowly recovering, however the country is yet divided into 
autonomous regions and Islamist insurgent group fighting against the central government.  As 
an emerging actor in Africa, Turkey has been involved in the international community’s 
effort to settle the Somali political process for the last years. To support the Somalia’s 
political process, the Turkish political elites have taken several initiatives, including: 
multidimensional approach to raise the Somalia problem to the international level, mobilizing 
the civil society, and taking a mediation role between the political rivalries.  
 5.3.1. Turkey’s multidimensional approach to Somalia’s political process  
 
Beside the solidarity visits of its leaders, and the humanitarian and development assistance, 
the Turkish government has looked a multidimensional approach, as another major move to 
take the Somalia problem to the international desk. For Turkey, the magnitude of Somalia’s 
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problems, not only requires a regional approach but also a more comprehensive global 
response (Davutoğlu, 2012, p. 3). Turkey’s Deputy Prime Minister Emrullah İşler stressed the 
necessary of regional and international approach to stabilize Somalia, by saying, "Turkey 
works for supplying stability and security in the country,[Somalia] supports the peace 
attempts in the Horn of Africa and struggles to convince regional and international actors to 
contribute to peace.", (Inanç, 2014), while explaining the importance of regional and 
international effort to stabilize Somalia. In that sense, Turkey, hosted several high level 
international conferences on Somalia’s future in Istanbul, seeking an international 
comprehensive solution for the state building problems. The first conference took place in 
Istanbul from 21-23 May, 2010, with over 50 member states, including 20 ministers, to build 
a sustainable peace and viable economic structures (UNPOS, 2010). The three day 
conference, which co-convened by the United Nations and Turkey, urge the Somali leaders to 
come up with a viable, comprehensive and lasting peace in Somalia, the conference was also 
intended to promote the Somalia’s economic investment. The Turkish government, which 
was hosting the conference, as part of the international community plague its support to the 
Somali people convalesce from the devastated civil war. A proposed Task force by the 
Islamic Development Bank to bring together all development partners and agencies to 
"respond to Somalia's critical needs pending the stabilization of the country, was agreed to be 
chaired by the government of Turkey (Istanbul Conference on Somalia, 2010). The Istanbul 
declaration issued at the end of the conference emphasized the need to keep the Djibouti 
Peace Process, the need to build a professional army for Somalia, and the need of the 
Transitional government to continue dialogue with all Somalia’s political stakeholders 
(Istanbul Conference on Somalia, 2010). 
 
The second conference on Somalia hosted by Turkey, took place in Istanbul from 31st  May 
to 1st  June 2012 . The two day conference, which was a follow up to the previously held in 
Istanbul on 2010, focused on building long term solution to the Somalia’s chronic violence 
and state failure. Under the theme of “Preparing Somalia’s Future: Goals for 2015”, the 
Turkish government invited the Somalia government leadership, East Africa regional leaders, 
as well as the international community to discuss building a long-term multi-dimensional 
solutions for Somalia’s future, and to urge the Somalia leaders to end the road map and the 
long transitional period of Somalia’s governance by August 20, 2012. Making clear the 
Turkish government’s goal of the conference, then Turkish ambassador to Somalia 




issues related to post-transition..[…], but in the meantime helping the current process be in 
timely” (Al Jazeera, 2012).  
 
Attended by representatives from 57 countries and 11 international and regional 
organizations, the conference, made another significant step toward Somalia’s backing on the 
eyes of the international community for state building support. As a host of the conference for 
the second time in two years, and a major donor for Somalia’s development and recovery, 
Turkey proposed the establishment of a new ‘ Rebuilding and Restructuring Fund for the 
Somalia security’ in which the conference endorsed to proceed the initiative. As a result of 
the last two political conferences in Istanbul, Somalia has made huge progress in its political 
process. A new parliament, speaker and president have been elected in 2012,  a new 
constitution has been enacted, and the long failed transitional period had ended in 2012. Since 
then, Somalia has entered a new period in its journey from recovering civil war and political 
crises, and the Somalia government expanded its control of the country from the AL Shabab.  
 
Figure 5 Participants of Second Istanbul Conference on Somalia from 31st May to 1st June 2012. 
The third gathering hosted by Turkey was the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC)’s 
member states’ conference on Somalia in Istanbul. As the worst humanitarian crises in three 
decades hit the East African region, Turkey, called an emergence ministerial-level meeting of 




of the Somalia’s famine crises and seek a collective response (Khaleej Times, 2011). Thanks 
to Turkey’s initiative, the conference secured $350 pledged aid to fight famine in Somalia 
(Khaleej Times, 2011). Participated by the Then President Gul, the then prime minister, 
president Erdogan and then foreign minister, Prime Minster Davutoglu, showed the 
uniqueness sign of Turkey’s effort to boost the Somali case to the international level. 
Speaking at the conference Erdogan announced his intention to go to Somalia to affirm his 
country’s solidarity with the Somali people and break the rhetoric of No-go zone Somalia.  In 
another occasion, speaking at the United Nations on 22 September 2011, a month after his 
visit to Mogadishu, Erdogan allocated half of his UN General Assembly speech to Somalia.  
Speaking passionately about the Somalia crises, Erdogan challenged the world leaders to the 
need for collective international response to the horn of African war torn country to store 
stability and rebuild the state (International Crises Group, 2012, p. 3). 
  5.3.2. Turkey’s mediation role in Somalia  
 
Beside organizing international conferences for the support of Somalia’s state building 
process, Turkey has also taken part in the national reconciliation and reunification process. 
Giving the significance of Somalia’s political reconciliation, then Turkish foreign ministry 
Davutoglu stressed “Without national reconciliation, we cannot have a real political 
achievement, as well as real humanitarian development, when there are de facto authorities 
in different parts of Somalia”,
8
. Despite the Al Shabab threat, the country is yet divided into 
autonomous regions, undermining the authority of the central government. The Turkish 
governments made it clear its impartiality in Somalia political crises. Explaining this, then 
deputy prime minister of Turkey Bekir Bozdağ said in 2013:“This attention is not at all 
political. We are neither close to, nor far from any sides in Somalia. While holding equal 
distance to all, we deal with Somalia’s hunger, health, education issues as a humanitarian 
duty and a responsibility driven by our conscience.” (Binder & Erten, 2013, p. 8). However, 
Turkey expressed its intention to mediate in several occasions. One of these de facto states 
that Turkey mediates with the central government is Somaliland. 
 
 Somaliland is a self-declared independent state, but internationally recognized as an 
autonomous region of Somalia. The northwestern region of Somalia; Somaliland, which was 
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colonized by the England, has declared its independence in 26 June 1960, however, four days 
after its independence, the region decided to unite with southern Somalia, which was 
colonized by Italy, on the first July 1960, to establish greater Somalia. The leaders from both 
regions established a unitary democratic government and successful elections had been held 
in the country. However, with the military coup in 1969, led by General Mohamed Siad 
Barre, was a turning point of Somaliland’s sidesteps from Somalia. As the paramilitaries 
against the government emerged out in northern regions of Somalia in 1980s, the military 
regime bombed the rebels and made atrocities against the civilians. With the collapse of the 
central government, the Somaliland region declared its independence from the rest of the 
country, however, the federal government seeks again the reunification of the country. The 
international community is urging both sides to seek their goals through negotiation. After 21 
years of serious lobbying for international recognition, Somaliland finally accepted to meet 
and talk with its Somalia counterparts, with the facilitation of the international community to 
resolve the subject. The first of such talks took place in near London, UK on 21 June 2012, 
(BBC, 2012), where both parties agreed to continue the dialogue. With the facilitation of the 
European Union and Britain, ten officials — five from each side — met in closed-door 
discussions (Voice of America (VOA), 2012).  The international community praised the 
parties for commencing such talks after decades of Somalia’s civil war. A week after UK 
talks, the leaders from the Somalia federal government and the Somaliland administration 
met in Dubai on a presidential level to further continue the London talks. The leaders signed 
Dubai statement to cooperate and continue the dialogue.  
 
Later on UK and Dubai’s mediation, the Turkish foreign ministry has taken the lead in 
hosting both parties in Ankara to continue the discussions as both parties welcomed the 
initiative and agreed to meet in Istanbul occasionally. Although Turkey recognizes and 
respects the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Somalia, however, it has enjoyed good 
relations with all actors of Somalia’s political process, including Somaliland; where even 
Turkey managed to open a consulate attached to the Mogadishu based embassy, in Hargeisa; 
the capital city of Somaliland, unlike no other country, as Somaliland doesn’t countenance. 
After a very tough negotiation and Turkish diplomacy involved in separate as well as 
trilateral meetings with then Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoğlu, then Prime Minister 
Erdoğan and then President Gül, the two leaders agreed to sign Ankara Communiqué on 13th 
April 2013, to cooperate on security, social and economic areas. The two leaders agreed also 




Istanbul occasionally, according to the communiqué signed by the leaders,  Since the 
beginning of the talks in Turkey, both parties have agreed many issues so far, including: the 
road map of the discussion, joint civil aviation administration team of Somalia’s airspace, 
sharing the international development assistance, security and intelligence information 
sharing regarding  piracy and terrorism  and the way forward of the future talks. The 
following is the first Ankara communiqué attended by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud of 
the federal republic of Somalia and Somaliland leader.  
 
Figure 6 Signing ceremony of Ankara communiqué on 13 April 2013. 
 
Beside the autonomous regions, Al Shabab poses a security threat to the existence of the 
Somalia government, and many Somali scholars call on Turkey, as an impartial international 
actor, to mediate talks between the government and Al-Shabaab (Anadolu Ajansi, 2013). 
Speaking to Anadolu Agency, Sh. Bashir Ahmed Salad, the head of  the Council of Somali 
Scholars said "I believe that Turkey, as a strong state, can find solutions to Somalia' s 
problems," referring to the country’s twenty years political crises. Regarding Al Shabab, Sh. 
Bashir added that Turkey could play a mediating role between the government and the group, 
"Negotiating with the Al-Shabaab organization carries high importance and is not a difficult 
thing. Solving the crisis through peaceful and diplomatic means is possible," (Anadolu 
Ajansi, 2013), Salad said. However, there has not been such a move from Turkey to take the 
lead.  
5.4. Peace Building Support 
 
Peace building covers a wide range of activities,  According to the UN Secretary-




strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, which is coherent to 
the specific needs of the country concerned, based on national ownership (UN Peace building 
support office, n.d). Peace building includes a wide range of efforts by diverse actors in 
government and civil society at the community, national and international levels to support 
peace and stability.  Based on the this definition, the study evaluates, Turkey’ role in the 
Somalia peace building process in two main areas. First, mobilizing and assembling civil 
society and diaspora, and second, building security institutions.  
5.4.1. Mobilizing Civil Society and Diaspora toward Somalia's peace building process 
 
Another way, Turkey contributed significantly to Somalia’s peace process, is the 
mobilization of the civil society and Diasporas actors toward the Somalia ‘state building. The 
first of such move was the Somali civil society conference in Istanbul hosted by Turkey. The 
conference, which took place from May 27 -30, 2012, combined about 300 Somali 
delegation, including 135 elders, members of NGOs, religious elders and diasporas from a 
wide variety of countries, women, intellectuals to discuss the Somalia’s future (Ladan Affi, 
2012). With the theme ‘for Somalis and by Somalis’, The conference,  was unique in its kind, 
contrary to earlier Somali conferences, where the civil society, had no voice to contribute to 
the peace and political process of the country’s future. Opened with a speech by then Foreign 
Minister of Turkey, Ahmed Davutoglu (Anadolu Ajansi, 2012c), the conference participants 
discussed, security, economic reconstruction, social development, reconciliation, and the 
constitution of the country (Ladan Affi, 2012). 
 
Another event to mobilize the Somalia civil society was the Global Somali Diaspora 
conference in Istanbul. With over 1.5 million Somalis living in diaspora, and remittances 
estimated at $1.3bn-$2bn a year, (theguardian, 2012) , the Somali diaspora are crucial for 
peace building, development and the politics of the country.  The conference, which took 
place in Istanbul, attended by then Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu and Deputy 
Prime Minister Emrullah İşler and the key prominent of the Somali diaspora living outside 
the country, (Inanç, 2014). The role of the Somali diaspora in rebuilding the state, economic 
investment, and rebuilding the social services have been discussed in the conference, 
(Somalicurrent, n.d). Speaking at the conference, İşler underlined the role of diaspora in 
Somalia’s future said "Somalis in the diaspora must preserve their culture and links with 




economic, political and social problems." (Inanç, 2014). Thanks to the event, Global Somali 
Diaspora (GSD), a common platform for all Somalis living outside the country, was 
established at the conference.  
 5.4.2. Building Security Institutions  
 
Security is the main challenge the Somali government is facing as Al Shabab; an AL Qaeda 
affiliated Islamist insurgent group, is posing threat to the existence of state institutions and 
government personnel. Security is also critical for the international community’s re-
engagement and foreign investment in the country. To restore peace and stability in the 
country, the international community has spent millions of dollars to AMISOM; the African 
Union Mission in Somalia, however, the move was criticized by the Somalis and non-
Somalis by not investing enough to the Somali security services. Turkey, which has no 
ground troops in Somalia, utilizes civilian power policies to rebuild the state, by helping 
restructure and improve the capacity of the Somalia security institutions, while many other 
international actors in Somalia heavily rely on the foreign troops. Then Turkish Foreign 
Minister Davutoglu emphasizing the importance of building the Somalia security services to 
stabilize that country, said: “ Somali led public order based on sovereignty of Somalia, 




To increase the number and the quality of the security services, Turkey signed military 
cooperation with Somalia on May 22, 2010 to train and equip the Somali troops. Though the 
agreement wasn’t soon carry out after its inception; however, it was enforced on November 
2012 as it was published in the Turkish official Gazette. According to the signed document, 
the Turkish Military Medical Academy and Mapping General Command will provide training 
to the Somali forces in Turkish military schools on task related courses, on the job training at 
units, headquarters and institutions (Todays Zaman, 2012). In addition to the training, both 
countries will cooperate in areas such as: military logistic, peace support, exchanging in 
visiting harbors and docks, invitation to military exercises as observers, participation in joint 
exercises (Todays Zaman, 2012). Since that agreement reached out, several trainings have 
been carried out by the Turkish army and police both in Somalia and Turkey, the construction 
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of military and police academy in Somalia were started and  the army officials exchanged 
several visits, as June 2014 Turkish Navy Warship visited Mogadishu Seaport.  
 
5.4.2.1. Police and Intelligence Services Support 
 
To preserve the public peace and prevent and detect crimes, several police trainings were 
conducted both in Somalia and Turkey. The first batch of Somali police personnel were 
imparted to Turkey to be trained in counter terrorism courses between 29 June and 16 July of 
2012, (Meydanistanbul, 2012). A total of 60 personnel comprised 48 men, 5 women and 7 
administrators had undergone a series of training at Arnavutköy police training center in 
Istanbul (Yeni Şafak, 2012,).  About a month long training, the trainees were sent back to 
Somalia to partake in the fight against Al Shabab. Since that was the first successful training 
batch, another 500 police team is expected to arrive in Turkey in the near future for training 
(Pressmedya, 2013). As part of its international police cooperation project, TIKA facilitated 
an intelligence training to 12 key Somali police officers in Mogadishu between 14 and 25 
May of 2012, (TIKA, 2012b, p. 359), to enhance their knowledge and capacity in intelligence 
gathering to restore the security and stability of the city.  
 
While these trainings continue in Turkey, however, there is always a need to rebuild the 
infrastructure of the country’s security institutions to put up a home grown effective security 
personnel and to achieve long term stability. In this regard, after the attack on its embassy in 
Mogadishu, Turkey decided to establish a Police Academy in Somalia to increase the number 
and the quality of the Somali police forces (T24, 2013).  After completion of the project, the 
school will have the capacity to train 2 thousand and 400 police officers in the first stage, and 
the Academy will be the forefront in the fight against terrorism (T24, 2013). Crime 
investigation, detention and interrogation, countering terrorist incidents and intervening in 
social uprising, will be among the topics to be trained for the Somali police forces. In 
addition to the trainings, Turkey will provide 1000 MP5 rifles, 20 sniper rifle, 500 guns and 
gas guns to the newly trained police in the academy (T24, 2013).  
 
5.4.2.2. Somalia National Army Support  
 
As the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs supports with direct cash to the African Union’s 




Coordination Agency, 2013e, p. 138), however, as a long term strategy for Somalia’s 
stability, Turkey is assisting the Somali armed forces as another major security sector. The 
Somali government has been lobbying in the international community to consider building 
the Somali army as the greatest strategy to achieve an enduring success against Al Shabab, 
and long term stability for the country. In spite of the fact that the international community 
supports the Somali army, however, the support is far limited compared to its heavy 
investment to AMISOM. While giving support to the African mission in Somalia, Turkey 
started to invest mainly to the Somali army. In 2013, the first batch of such series groups 
from the Somalia army was transported to Turkey for a yearlong military training in the 
context of both countries’ signed protocols in cooperation of military training. A total of 110 
Somali military officers, comprised 58 officers, and 52 noncommissioned Officers (NCOs), 
graduated in the summer of 2014, after 10 months of intensive military training in Turkey 
(Haberler, 2014). The officers were sent back to Somalia to join the Somali army.   As that 
training was the first successful batch, currently 103 Somali military officials are in Turkey to 
be trained for land, sea and air defense (Radio Muqdisho, 2015). 
 
While these trainings contribute significantly to the quality and the effectiveness of the army, 
however, as the military institutions collapsed during the civil war, there is a need for a 
broader strategy to rebuild the infrastructure of the military. The Turkish ministry of foreign 
affairs and the Turkish chief of staff sent a team of 6 military officers (one brigadier general, 
two lieutenant-colonel, two majors and one captain), to Somalia to look ways of restructuring 
and modernization of the Somalia forces. Based on the findings of the team’s report, Turkey 
allocated 20 million TL to the Somali army to construct a new military academy in 
Mogadishu as part of the Somali force modernization (Pressmedya, 2013). The new academy, 
which currently under construction will have the capacity to train 100 
noncommissioned officers in the first stage, while a professional military education of land, 
air and sea Schools foundations will be followed (Pressmedya, 2013).  Regarding the sea, 
which Somalia faces the challenge of piracy and illegal fishing,  Turkey provided 4 patrol 
boats to the Somalia Coast guard forces In 2013 (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination 





5.4.2.3. Judiciary Institution’s Support 
 
As part of the peace building process, the Somali government is also facing the challenge of 
reforming its judiciary system; a key for Somalia’ peace building and reconciliation process. 
The Somali government strives to reform the country’s judiciary to enhance the integrity and 
the reliability of the personnel and the trustworthiness of their decisions. Turkey is assisting 
the Somalia government in its willful to reform the judiciary. The Then Minister of Justice & 
Constitutional Affairs, Farah Sheikh Abdulkadir, visited Turkey at the invitation of his 
counterpart, H.E. Bekir Bozdag, the Minister of Justice of the Turkish Republic, in 2015 to 
discuss on ways of Turkey’s support to the Somalia judiciary capacity (Raxanreeb, 2015). As 
the Somali minister spent 4 working days in Turkey, and visited various justice institutions 
such as the Judiciary Commission, ministry and departmental offices, ‘Turkey Justice 
Academy’ (Türkiye Adalet Akademisi, 2015) and other significant institutions, Turkey 
pledged to provide the necessary support to the reform of the Somalia judiciary system 
(Raxanreeb, 2015). Following the Ankara meeting, officials from the Turkish ministry of 
justice visited Mogadishu in April to evaluate the capacity of the Somalia’s justice 
institutions, including Mogadishu central prison and find out ways to assist (Radio Muqdisho, 
2015), in reforming the judiciary. Generally, as both parties recently started collaboration of 
this field, the study didn’t find enough tangible support that Turkey contributed in the 
judiciary system of the country; however it is expected in the future. 
5.5. Enhancing the capacity of State Institutions  
 
As the state institutions collapsed during the civil war, Somalia government also is facing the 
challenge of restoration and restructuring of all the state institutions, besides the security and 
political challenges. Institutions are crucial for Somalia’s recovery from the long years of 
anarchy. For that reason, the international community has been working with the Somalia 
government to restore the key intuitions of the government to respond to the people’s needs. 
As part of these international efforts, Turkey has played a unique role in rebuilding the 
Somalia state institutions. Most of the key Turkish government institution has partnered with 
its Somali counterparts to assist rebuild these intuitions. Somalia has greatly benefited from 
this relationship of institution to institution, such as ministry to ministry, parliament to 
parliament, municipality to municipality, and chief to chief of staff. The state capacity 




government personnel, equipping and rebuilding the infrastructure of the state institutions 
such as the government buildings, and financial support to the government.  
 
The Turkish state institutions and NGOs involve in the support of almost every sector of the 
Somali state institutions. The Turkish government supports to enhance the capacity of the 
security intuitions, judiciary, public finance management, and also key ministries. According 
to Anadolu agency, Turkey will rebuild a number of Somali government buildings such as 
Parliament Building, and Prime Ministry (Anadolu Agency, 2012).  
5.5.1. Direct Budget Support  
 
Upon a request from President Hassan Sheikh, the Turkish foreign ministry started a direct 
cash support to the Somali government during June-December 2013. The $ 4.5 million as aid 
package monthly payment (Keydmedia, 2014) was carried to Somalia via courier through the 
Turkish embassy in Mogadishu, as the country’s banking system wasn’t reliable to transfer 
such huge money especially in that year. According to Turkish Official Development 
assistance, Turkey delivered 15 million USD to the Somalia government in a direct budget 
support (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency, 2013e, p. 12). At the end of the 
2013, as there were rumors published by some media outlets that Turkey had cut the direct 
cash to Somalia, the Turkish Ministry of foreign affairs reaffirmed in a press statement the 
intention to continue the budget support for the year of 2014 (Turkish Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 2014). According to the statement, the direct budget support has helped the Somali 
government to pay the salary of all its public personnel on a regular base and carry out its 
state building activities. To support the Somalia government’s effort to reform its public 
financial institutions, Turkey sent financial experts to the Somalia central Bank, as part of the 
state building process (Public Diplomacy Coordinator, n.d). 
 5.5.2. IT Infrastructures Support to key government institutions 
 
In 2013,  in an official visit of the Somalia Prime Minister Abdi Farah Shirdon to Turkey, the 
Somalia ministry of foreign affairs signed an agreement with its Turkish counterpart to help 
construct a secure channel of communication between the ministry and its embassies in all of 
the all the world. The agreement was to help the Somali government with the necessary 
technological equipment and training of the personnel, to keep and secure the information 




expected to establish for other government ministries. Beside the provision and set up of the 
technological equipment, there have been a number of trainings for staff of the ministry in 
Turkey. The last training has been provided for a ten members from the technology 
department of the ministry to create a secure communication between the Somalia embassies 
and the foreign ministry (Radio Muqdisho, 2014).  
5.5.3. Government Personnel Training  
 
Beside the financial and material support to the Somalia government to enhance the capacity 
of the state institutions, Turkey also supports the provision of training to both civil and 
military servants of the government. The study flashes a glance, some of these trainings. 
First: The Turkish ministry of foreign affairs assists its Somalia counterpart in developing its 
human resource by providing training to the young diplomats and administrative staff of the 
ministry. For instance a total of 10 diplomats from Somalia has been trained in Turkey 
between March 23 - 29, 2014 by the Turkish diplomacy Academy in key foreign policy 
topics (Diplomasi Akademisi, 2014d). As there have been  many trainings to the ministry and 
a number of teams have been already trained by the Academy of Turkey’s foreign ministry, 
the last session one was provided to four diplomats from the Somalia ministry of foreign 
affairs between 22 and 29 March of this year (Diplomasi Akademisi, 2015e). The diplomats 
were trained on topics like, diplomacy and foreign policy making, international security and 
peace making, diplomatic correspondence and language, mediation, embassy administration, 
general protocol rules, while the trainees were toured in some of the government institutions 
(Diplomasi Akademisi, 2015e).  
 
Second: Upon request from the Somali presidency, the Diplomacy Academy of the Turkish 
foreign ministry has undertaken a number of trainings for the Somali protocol officers inside 
Somalia and Turkey. For instance, in Turkey, three officials from the Somali presidency 
office have been trained in ‘protocol rules and practices’ between September 30 – October 
05, 2013, as they also had meetings with the Directorate of Protocol of Turkish Presidency 
and the Directorate of Protocol of the Turkish Foreign Ministry to see the practice of protocol 
rules (Diplomasi Akademisi, 2013a). In Mogadishu, the Academy organized protocol training 
between 9 and 13 February of 2015, for the protocol staff of the Presidency in areas "General 
Protocol Rules", "Meetings and Receptions", "Organization of Bilateral and Multilateral 




 5.5.4. Enhancing the capacity of local governments 
 
As Mogadishu, the capital city of Somalia paid the heavy price of Somalia’s state failure; the 
city has suffered from deadliest civil war and destruction of the state institutions. The 
Mogadishu Municipality, likewise other collapsed state institutions, lacks the capacity to 
perform like any other municipality in the world. The Turkish state institutions such as 
Turkish Red Crescent, TIKA and Istanbul municipality have been collaborating with the 
municipality to enhance its capacity in various aspects. To enhance the urban transformation 
of the city, the Turkish Red Crescent and Istanbul municipality in collaboration with the 
Mogadishu city administration constructed a concrete plant; a cobblestone production facility 
and stone crusher unit to meet the material need for the city roads construction. TRC has 
assisted the Mogadishu municipality in rehabilitation and reconstruction the water basin of 
the city by using a grid system to discharge the wastes. The Mogadishu municipality was also 
provided a number of trucks to collect and deliver garbage from the roads of the city. TRC 
has also provided 320 garbage containers to Mogadishu municipality to maintain the 
cleanliness of the city (Turkish Red Crescent, 2015, p. 13). According to TRC, approximately 
a total of 600 garbage containers (Turkish Red Crescent, 2015, p. 13) are being daily 
collected from the streets of Mogadishu. To rub out the signs of the destruction of civil war, 
and to restore the beauty of the city, TRC has also assisted Mogadishu municipality the 
removal of debris and ruins of the old buildings of the city starting with the public buildings. 
 
On the other hand, The Turkish state institutions also assisted Mogadishu municipality in the 
provision of training to its personnel. In collaboration with the Union of Turkish World 
Municipalities (TDBB), TIKA facilitated a 6 day training program on urbanization and 
transportation infrastructure for 15 Somali (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency, 
2012d, p. 44) local administrators in Turkey (TIKA, 2012b, p. 272). Leadership and 
management, urban planning, financial structure of local governance, were among the topics 
provided to the trainees beside site visiting Istanbul municipality to see the urbanization 
practices (TIKA, 2012b, p. 272).  
5.6. Developing Social Service Institutions   
 
The civil war has affected the destruction of almost all Somalia’s state institutions, including 




the ministry of education are in place, however, the effectiveness and capacity to provide 
social services to the whole population are far too limited. In the following sections, the study 
presents the Turkish government and its NGOs’ role in rebuilding the institutions and 
provision of social services in Somalia.  
5.6.1. Education Service Development  
 
Owing to the twenty years gab of ineffective governments, the educational institutions in 
Somalia run mainly by private institutions with minor government guidance. Although these 
private institutions attempted to fill up the gap to provide educational services throughout the 
country, however, many of the poor families’ children could not afford to attend these private 
schools and universities. Turkish NGOs and state institutions worked closely with the Somali 
ministry education to improve the country’s educational systems. The Turks also provided 
scholarships to many Somali children to study both in Somalia and Turkey. In 2011, the 
ministry of education signed an agreement with the Nile Foundation of Turkey to enhance the 
educational system of the country (SomaliaReport, 2011). The foundation will assist in 
rebuilding the educational infrastructure in primary and secondary schools throughout the 
country, and also will provide training to the Somali teachers (SomaliaReport, 2011). In 2015 
with Erdogan’s visit to Mogadishu, Turkey signed also signed cooperation agreements in the 
fields of youth and sports with Somalia, (KARAGÖZ, 2015), which is another step of 
enhancing the cooperation in social services. 
 
5.6.1.1. Enhancing local Educational Institutions  
 
Beside the scholarships provided, and the schools built in the country, Turkish government 
organizations and NGOs realized the need for enhancing the capacity of local educational 
institutions. Many new schools have been constructed; others have been repaired, and the 
necessary technological equipment has been provided to the higher educational institutions. 
The first Turkish high school was opened in Somalia by Nile foundation in 2012, which 
currently has at least 200 students. In the same year, Kimse yok mu constructed a high school 
merely for girls with dormitory in Mogadishu (Anadolu Ajansi, 2012). The Turkish religious 
foundation (Diyanet) supported the reconstruction and maintenance of Sheikh Sufi Secondary 
School building, (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency, 2012d, p. 87), in 
Mogadishu. According to a protocol agreement with the Somali Ministry of Education, the 




out the reconstruction and maintenance of the school and support the necessary financial and 
equipment required to run the school. As it was renamed to Sheikh Sufi Imam Hatip 
Secondary school, 90% of the students are orphans while the other 10% are students from 
poor families (BUGUN, 2013). 
 
In 2013, the humanitarian relief foundation (IHH) sponsored the construction of a new 
modern school named Anatolia Education Center in Mogadishu, which intended for the 
orphans and the children of the poor families. The 10,000 square-meters field has an 
administrative building, a dormitory, a sports hall, a health clinic and the school building.  
With the capacity of 1,500 students to study in, the school is one of the biggest educational 
schools of the country. 400 of the students live in the school dormitories, while the rest just 
come for studying (IHH, 2013).  In Zeyla city of northern Somalia, TIKA supported the 
maintenance and repair of Saadadin School and a dormitory, (Turkish Cooperation and 
Coordination Agency, 2012d), for the local students to study and stay in.  
 
Beside the construction of the schools, the Turkish state institution also supported the higher 
education institutions. To enhance the capacity of the higher education institutions in 
Somalia, TIKA has supported the universities and schools working in higher education with 
educational equipment and facilities. In 2012, TIKA provided 400 computers, 100 printers, 
overhead projects and generators to Somalia universities and mainly Mogadishu University 
(TIKA, 2012b, p. 269). The number has increased in 2013, as the total of computers donated 
to priority regions of Somalia reached to 600 (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination 
Agency, 2013e, p. 108). In the northern Somalia, TIKA has supported the physical capacity 
of Hargeisa regional education administration with office furniture, overhead projector, 
televisions, desktop computers, and renovating 2 offices and boardroom (TIKA, 2012b, p. 
269).  
 
5.6.1.2. Vocational Schools  
 
Another type that Turkish institutions assisted the educational service of the country is 
building vocational schools to train those youth who have no formal education to enter the 
job market, and here are the following. First: In Galkayo, a city in south central Somalia, 
TIKA built a vocational training center to provide training to the trainers (TOT). TIKA has 




desktop computers, printers and office furniture. According 2012 TIKA’s annual report, 200 
young people benefited from the training program given by the trainers in the school (TIKA, 
2012b, p. 269). Second: In close collaboration with the ministry of Education and Banaadir 
regional administration, TRC is constructing a vocational high school in Mogadishu. After 
finishing this project, the school will have the capacity to train at least 288 students in the 
field of machinery, electrical, construction and IT (Turkish Red Crescent, 2015, p. 15).  
 
Third: In cooperation with the Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Livestock, TIKA and IHH 
collaborated to construct an Agricultural School in Mogadishu, which started its educational 
activities in the year of 2013 in Mogadishu. Somalia has two major rivers, arable land and 
suitable climate to cultivate throughout the year. For this reason students were brought from 
the regions, that the two Somali Rivers pass over, including Hiran, Lower Shaballe, Middle 
Shabelle, Bay, and Lower Juba regions, to educate and train them in the modern agricultural 
skills.  In four weeks long training sessions (TIKA, 2013c, p. 165).  The four weeks 
theoretical and practical training, students are taught the skills such as irrigation techniques, 
land tilling, seedling growing, seedling replanting, hoeing, seed generation, storage, 
apiculture, livestock husbandry, and efficient use of water As they finish the training the 
students were sent back to their regions with the required tools and seeds for agriculture 
given by TIKA (TIKA, 2013c, p. 165). 
 
Fourth: fishing school. Somalia has the longest seaside in the African continent, running 
along the Red Sea and Indian Ocean, the country endowed with huge maritime resources. 
However, due to the civil war, lack of fishing industries and knowledge of maritime 
education, the fishing in Somalia has been untouched industry, the Germany based, Turkish 
NGO; Hasene Berlin foundation constructed Maritime and fishing school in Mogadishu. The 
Indian Ocean sided Maritime and Fishing Institute was opened in 2014 with collaboration 
with the City University’s Faculty of maritime in curriculum and teaching. The school 
currently has 50 students, who receive both theoretical and practical training in maritime 
resource (Hasene, 2014).  
 
5.6.1.3. Scholarships  
 
Many Turkish state institutions and NGOs have provided a huge number of scholarships to 




involvement in Somalia, nearly $70 million has been allocated for 1,200 Somali students, 
(Harte, 2012) to study in Turkey with full scholarship, and the numbers have been increasing 
for the last years. This study haven’t ascertain the exact number of Somalis studying with 
scholarships in Turkey as that because many of the small NGOs and charities that bring the 
students in different periods, lack a recorded data which makes hard to identify  the number 
of the students and the level of their studies. However, the most prominent institutions are the 
Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB), Scientific and Technological 
Research Council of Turkey (TUBITAK), Diyanet, KIMSE YOK MU and NILE 
Organization. These institutions have provided a great number of scholarships, and according 
to the recorded data, a total of 1979 Somali students are studying in Turkey with full 
scholarship, some of these students are University level students while many more are high 
school students. Beside the full scholarships provided to study in Turkey, there are 
semiannual and annual scholarship programs granted, for instance, in 2012, 400 lower-
secondary and secondary Somalis students were hosted in Turkey for 1 year of education 
(Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency, 2012d, p. 25). The following table presents 
in detail the number of the Somalis students studying in Turkey: 
 
Table 1 The total number of Somalia students studying with scholarship in Turkey10 
Name of the institutions  Number of scholarships  
YTP 42111 
DIYANET 61512 
KIMSE YOK MU 35013 
YARDIMELI (Helping Hand) 7514 
NILE Organization  51815 
TOTAL 1979 
                                                 
10
 The figures shown in the table are those recorded by the these institutions, however, as the 
study haven’t found the detailed reports of all the small NGOs involved in Somalia, certainly, 
the number could be greater than the above mentioned figures. 
11
 Mehmet Ozcan (2014) ‘Turkey’s Involvement in Somalia: Assesment of a State-Building in 
Progress’, P. 29, İstanbul.  










5.6.2. Health Service Development  
 
Health service institutions in Somalia, is also one of those state institutions hurt severely by 
the civil war.  Due to the limited capacity of the government, in Somalia under-5 and 
maternal mortality is among the highest in the world as most of the public hospitals in the 
country are not working properly. Turkey’s Somalia support is greatly visible in the health 
sector than any other social service. New hospitals and nursing schools have been built, and 
others have been renovated. In addition to the hospitals, Turkey sent a great number of 
Turkish doctors to Somalia to assist, while many Somali students and medical professionals 
have been brought to Turkey for medical education and training.  
 
 5.6.2.1. Hospitals  
 
To improve the quality of health service in the country, a number of hospitals have been 
constructed by the Turkish government and its NGOs. First, with the support of the Turkish 
Ministry of Health, The Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) and the 
presidency of Turkish housing administration (TOKI) undertook the construction of the East 
Africa’s most modern hospital in Mogadishu. The hospital, which is operating currently, was 
one of the biggest hospitals in Somalia before the civil war had started. President Erdogan 
attended the inauguration ceremony of the hospital in his second visit to Somalia with his 
counterpart President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (Anadolu Agency, 2015). During Erdogan’s 
visit to Somalia, in 2015, the two countries signed a protocol agreement on the hospital 
administration. According to that protocol, the hospital will be operated jointly by Somalia 
and Turkish ministry of health as the Turkish ministry will provide specialized doctors and 
financial support for the next five years, after which the hospital will be run fully by Somalia 
(Anadolu Agency, 2015).  The Recep Tayyip Erdogan hospital, which used to be called 
Digfeer but renamed to Erdogan as an honor to him, provides the possibility to do an 
internship to the Somali medical and nursing students. 36 assistants are expected to take part 
in the hospital’s training program each year (Anadolu Agency, 2015).   
 
The next five year’s estimate amount of the hospital’s operating budget is around $135.7 
million, of which $85.6 million will be contributed by Turkey and the rest will be paid by 
Somalia according to the protocol agreement (Anadolu Agency, 2015).  The 200 bed hospital 




person rooms (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency, 2013e, p. 33). The hospital 
has 12 intensive care beds, 14 newborn intensive care beds, 20 incubators, four operating 
rooms, a delivery room, as well as radiology and laboratory units. All medical departments 
can be found in the hospital, including children, maternity, urology, neurosurgery, plastic 
surgery, internal medicine, general surgery, anesthesia, eye and dental branches (Anadolu 
Agency, 2015). Regarding personnel, 52 Turkish and 91 local staff work as hospital 
administrators, head doctors, and financial directors, and the security will be provided by 40 
Somalis and five Turkish citizens, according to the protocol. 
 
The second hospital constructed by the Turks in Somalia is the mother and children’s 
hospital. In close collaboration with the Somali Ministry of Health, Yardimeli foundation is 
now finishing the construction of the hospital in Mogadishu. The 18 thousand square meters’ 
hospital will be one of the biggest mother and child hospital in Africa, according to the 
foundation. The 100 bed hospital will have sections such emergency room, operating rooms, 
observation rooms, and service rooms for children over 1 year of age (Yardimeli). The 
hospital will have a department of laboratories, department of common infectious diseases in 
Somalia, department of nutritional problems treatment. According to the protocol signed by 
the Yardimeli foundation and the Somali Ministry of Health, the foundation will train the 
Somali medical personnel in Turkey to work in the hospital (Yardimeli).  
 
The third Turkish hospital implemented in Somalia constructed by KIMSE YOK MU. In 
2014, the foundation constructed Deva International Training and Research Hospital in 
Mogadishu. The hospital provides general medical services such as internal and external 
medicine, obstetrics and pediatric units (BUGUN, 2014). Beside the fees charged to the 
normal people, the hospital provides free medical services to the poor people (Al Jazeera 
Turk, 2014). By capacity, the 50-bed hospital has, 2 VIP rooms, 2 operating rooms, 6-bed 
intensive care, 8 incubators for neonatal units and referral ambulances (BUGUN, 2014) 
 
The fourth hospital, which is one of the early Turkish hospitals implemented in Somalia is 
Al-Shifa Hospital built by Doctors Worldwide (Yeryüzü Doktorlar) foundation.  The 62 bed 
hospital has inpatient capacity, with 2 surgery rooms, 3 units of delivery room, biochemistry, 
hematology, microbiology laboratory, and radiology department (Turkish Cooperation and 
Coordination Agency, 2013e, p. 82). The hospital performs general and internal surgery 




polyclinics. The hospital provides medical services without charges to the poor families and 
employs 13 physicians and 79 other Somalian personnel who had 3-month training in Turkey, 
as well as well as Turkish volunteer Physicians (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination 
Agency, 2013e, p. 82).  
 
In addition to the Mogadishu based hospitals, Turkey is attempting to spread the health 
facilities throughout the country. TRC in collaboration with the Turkish embassy in 
Mogadishu, is building micro hospitals in In Somaliland, Taleh, Awdal, Boramo, Jubaland- 
Kismayo, Bay-Baidawa, Middle Shabelle- Jowhar, Galmudug- Galkayo and Sool- 
Lascanonut, to provide health services to the people in need of these regions 
(Turkish Red Crescent, 2015, p. 16). As it could be seen in the 2015 report, TRC has 
expanded its operation throughout the country in almost every region, by distributing foods 
for the needy people and assisting local authorities. The following map shows TRC’s 
footprints and operation centers in Somalia.  
 





In collaboration with the local administration, TIKA has completely renovated and repaired 
Barbara Hospital in northern Somalia. The hospital, which is the biggest in the city of 
Barbara was equipped with the necessary equipment for water and electricity and also some 
treatment devices like CBC device, urea analysis. The hospital serves 500 people a day, 
according to TIKA’s 2012 report (TIKA, 2012b, p. 270).  Likewise, Barbara, TIKA also 
repaired the largest hospital in Puntland region; Galkayo hospital; which services 500 to 700 
people per day. The 70 bed capacity was given 2 ambulances and emergency supplies in 
addition to the provision of emergency training by TIKA (TIKA, 2012b, p. 270).  
 
 5.6.2.2. Nursing schools and medical personnel training  
 
In addition to the hospitals, there are a number of medical schools built or planned to be 
constructed by the Turks in Somalia to increase the number and quality of Somalia medical 
personnel. One of these schools is Ibn Sina Medical Vocational College. The school has 
departments of medical nursing, midwifery and laboratory technicians. The school started 
providing medical education from the academic year of 2013-2014 in Mogadishu (Turkish 
Cooperation and Coordination Agency, 2013e, p. 83). Another school, which is under 
construction by the Turkish Housing Administration (TOKI), is a medical nursing school 
with 40 classrooms, and is part of the Digfeer hospital project (Turkish Cooperation and 
Coordination Agency, 2013e, p. 137). The school will train the Somali medical doctors, and 
nurse personnel.  
 
In addition to the medical school, several training programs have conducted both in Somalia 
and in Turkey. For instance, by inviting Turkish physicians into Somalia, TIKA has 
sponsored three year specialty medical training program for the young Somali doctors in the 
fields of gynecology, internal medicine, general surgery, orthopedics, ophthalmology and 
pediatrics. The young doctors will also have the opportunity to do an internship in the 
Training and Research hospitals in Turkey (TIKA, 2013c, p. 164). Another training program 
organized by TIKA provided by Istanbul Medeniyet University. In collaboration with TIKA 
and Istanbul Medeniyet University, 10 Somali physicians received specialty training in 
general surgery and emergency & trauma surgery in Benadir University (Turkish 
Cooperation and Coordination Agency, 2013e, p. 83). In Hargeisa, northern Somalia a total 
of 20 midwives were trained by Turkish medical team of 8 person at Manhal Specialized 




haven’t learned the exact number of medical personnel trained so far in Turkey, however, 
there are a great number of Somalis who have been brought to Turkey for training several 
times since 2011.   
 5.6.3. Housing Service Development  
 
Housing is another social problem in Somalia as the country has been in civil war for a long 
period and many people internally displaced in the side the county.  As many poor families 
fled to Mogadishu in 2011 due to the famine crises hit many regions in Somalia, the need for 
relocating of these people had risen. Upon his second visit to Mogadishu, Erdogan; the 
Turkish president, announced that his government will assist the housing problem in Somalia.  
The 10,000 pledged houses, which ranging in size from 45 square meters to 85 square 
meters will be constructed within two years for lower- and middle-class families who can’t 
afford to build or buy, Erdogan told in Mogadishu. “We need to refine the lost image of 
Mogadishu, so that people will see that Mogadishu is recovering from the civil war”, 
(Bloomberg Business, 2015), Erdogan said in a press conference held in Mogadishu with his 
counterpart President Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud. If the project completed as it pledged, it 
will one of the biggest project Turkey has ever taken in Somalia and will solve the housing 
problem.  
5.7. Economic Infrastructure Development  
 
Years without an effective government, the Somalia businessmen, who are known with their 
exceptional entrepreneurship skills (O'Neill, 2013), managed to create intra and international 
business despite the security challenge to revive the country’s economy. However, as the role 
of the state in the economy has been limited, the key economic infrastructures have been 
devoid of development for a long time. To support this, Turkey sent at least 50 construction 
machines and trucks to Somalia, (Anadolu Ajansi, 2012), to be used for infrastructure 
development. In collaboration with Mogadishu city administration, the Turkish Red Crescent 
and Istanbul municipality have constructed a concrete plant; a cobblestone production facility 
and stone crusher unit, to meet the material need for the road construction 
(Turkish Red Crescent, 2015). In the following sections the study presents the infrastructure 






 5.7.1. Economic Investment  
 
While Somalia is recovering from devastating civil war, the Somalia government is seeking 
for foreign investment in the country for economic recovery. By creating jobs and 
opportunities for the Somalia youth, the economic investment is also critical to sustain the 
relative peace and security of the country. However, many potential foreign investors are yet 
skeptical about the vulnerability of security and the risk that Al Shabab could pose. Unlike 
other countries, the Turkey  is investing millions of dollars in infrastructure development and 
showed the willingness to take the risk despite the security challenges. To promote Turkish 
business investment in the country, the Somali president attended Turkey-Somalia Trade and 
Investment Forum held in Istanbul on 6th December, 2012. Organized by the Confederation 
of Turkish of businessmen and industrialists, the forum also participated by the Turkish 
Ministry of Economy, and the leading Turkish industries (TUSKON, n.d). Speaking at the 
event, the Somali president invited the Turkish businessmen to invest business opportunities 
exist in Somalia such as fishing and fish processing industry, energy, construction and 
building materials and furniture industries.   
 
In May 2013, the first Turkish-Somali Business Forum was launched in Istanbul organized by 
Somali and Turkish government ministries, to exchange business opportunities in both 
Somalia and Turkey and the ways of cooperation. The five day long trip of Somalia 
Businessmen in Turkey included meetings with their counterparts, roundtable discussions on 
potential commercial ventures and business to business relations. In February 2015, 
organized by the Turkish embassy in Mogadishu, Turkish businessmen visited Mogadishu to 
meet with the Somalia chamber of commerce and industry and the Somali businessmen. As 
the business relation between both countries strengthens for the last three years, the meeting, 
which took place in Mogadishu hotel, Somalia Chamber of Commerce presented the idea of 
joint venture business relation with the Turkish business.  
5.7.2. Airports and Ports  
 
Although currently the airport is under the administration of a Turkish company, which 
completed the construction of a new terminal, however, the airport had missed some 
necessary equipment to work as international airport ahead of the Turkish involvement in 
Somalia in 2011. In collaboration with the Turkish General Directorate of State Airports 




the VIP salon, installed VOR devices, trained airport personnel and fenced the with 9 km 
wire with walls (TIKA, 2012b, p. 274). Thanks to these renovations and Turkish Airlines 
flights from Istanbul to Mogadishu, the International Civil Aviation Organization removed 
the airport from ‘Zone 5’ list of airports deemed to pose a security risk to aircraft, crew and 
passengers (Ssebuyira & Ariong, 2013). On the other hand, TIKA is currently carrying out on 
the reconstruction of the Somali civil aviation school, (TIKA, 2015f, p. 34), which is 
significant to enhancing the capacity of the personnel and the smooth running of the Somalia 
airports. When it finished, the school will basically offer up to 12 civil aviation courses, 
including aeronautical, aviation security, and air traffic controller, among many others 
(Somalia Investor, 2015).  
 
Another key infrastructure development undertaken by the Turks in Somalia is the 
Mogadishu port. The port, which is the biggest in the country, and the main source of income 
for the government, manages by a Turkish company known as Al Bayrak; to modernize the 
facilities of the port. According to the agreement signed by both parties, Al Bayrak will 
manage the port in a period of 20 years, however, it's stipulated to improve the infrastructure 
of the port by building four new berths and repair others, bringing the number of working 
berths to 10 (Omar & Sheikh, 2014), installing all the necessary equipment for international 
standards and increasing the revenues of the port to the government.  
 5.7.3. Roads  
 
Due to the civil war and the limited capacity of the government, the transportation of Somalia 
devoid of development, like any other infrastructures of the country.  As promised by then 
Prime Minister, President Erdogan in his first visit to Mogadishu in 2011, TIKA has 
constructed 23km long road with 20-30m in width. The dual way road connects the airport 
the presidential palace and down to the city center, as one of the most important roads in the 
city. Beside the construction of the road, TIKA installed 736 new lighting posts in the newly 
constructed road (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency, 2013e, p. 45). The 





6. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS OF THE FINDINGS 
6.1. Introduction  
 
During the Cold War, Turkey’s foreign policy challenges were high-risk posing existentially 
threatening dangers, as the country had also suffered political instability and terrorism in the 
late 1970s. However, with the crumble of the international power structure and the end of the 
cold war, the Turkish foreign Policy has experienced an enormous transformation.. Since the 
early 2000s, the Turkish foreign policy to fragile states seems to have shifted dramatically 
from military means to civilian power capacity assistance (Sazak & Murphy, 2012, p. 1). As 
a candidate for EU membership, Turkey has absorbed the significance of the civilian power 
action in foreign policy by using diplomacy, economy and civilian means to resolve the 
international conflicts.  Since these times, Ankara has avoided military or hard power means 
to pursue national goals, and the Turkish foreign policy emphasized to foster peace and 
stability in its region and the world at large to achieve its desired ambition to become an 
international actor. By starting with the main components of this thesis, this chapter will 
discuss and analysis about the research findings. The first section will discuss about Turkey’s 
civilian power approach in Somalia, while the second section will examine, this policy’s 
contribution to the Somali state building process.  
6.3. Turkey’s Civilian Power approach to Somalia State Building Process 
 
As the central government of Somalia collapsed in 1991, Turkey was an active member of the 
first of international coalition sent troops to restore stability in the country, as Lieutenant 
General Çevik Bir, was appointed as the force commander of the UN Operation in Somalia 
(UNOSOM) II (International Crises Group, 2012, p. 2), to lead 28,000 military and civilian 
police personnel from 34 countries16 between April 1993 - January 1994 (United Nations, 
2003), however, as the operation did not yield a lasting peace in Somalia, Turkey along with 
the United Nations troops withdrew from the country in March 1995. Turkey’s first attempt 
to rebuild the Somalia state failed along with the United Nations mission in the Mogadishu 
Battle (1993). However, Turkey’s intervened in Somalia in 201, to respond to the 
                                                 
16
 Contributors of Military and Civilian Police Personnel OF UNOSOM  II 
Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, Egypt, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, India, Indonesia, 
Ireland, Italy, Kuwait, Malaysia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, 
Philippines, Republic of Korea, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, 




humanitarian crises that  hit the Horn of African region. Although the 2011 intervention was 
mainly motivated by humanitarian morality, however, Turkey’s post-2011 activities include 
state building initiatives, and development programs.  As indicated in Turkish foreign 
minister’s words,17 Turkey pursues a civilian approach to assist the Somalia state building 
and stabilization process. Instead, by using diplomacy to mediate, humanitarian and 
development assistance to all parts, building the state through infrastructure and institutional 
development, Turkey undertook a civilian power policy instrument to avoid involving in the 
conflict and taking an impartial choice from the political rivalries.  
On the other hand, Somalia has experienced several international interventions since its state 
collapse in 1991, which mostly has been direct military involvement; however, none has 
yielded the desired results. For instance, the first attempt was the 28,000 United Nation 
troops in 1992, to restore stability in the country. The operation failed due to the intense 
battle with some factions of Somalia’s warlords and fetched up with the complete withdrawal 
of the United Nations forces from Somalia in early March 1995. The Second attempt was the 
US backed Ethiopian invasion in Somalia in 2006, to fight against religiously motivated 
Islamist elements whose aim were to establish a sharia ruled state in Somalia. As part of its 
global counter terrorist war, the United States instigated a proxy war in Somalia by 
supporting at least 15,000 Ethiopian forces, (Lone, 2006) to invade the country. However, 
due to the historical hostility between Ethiopian and Somalis, let alone to eradicate the 
Islamist, the Ethiopian troops further deteriorate the situation as much more extremist 
elements, such Al Shabab emerged out. The 15,000 Ethiopian troops left behind far devolved 
in 2009, as Al Shabab seized control much of the Southern Somalia.  The third attempt was 
the establishment of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which was created 
by the Peace and Security Council of the African Union on 19th  January 2007, and 
authorized by the UN Security Council on 20th February 2007, with the mandate to support 
the Somalia Federal government build its institutions and employing all the necessary means 
to fight against Al Shabab (AMISOM). The 22,126 uniformed AMISOM personnel (both 
troops and police), was accused to yet succeed to defeat al Shabab since 2007. The European 
Union and other International actors in Somalia have been investing billions of dollars for 7 
consecutive years that AMISOM has been active in Somalia, yet Al Shabab today not only in 
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Somalia but carries attacks in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda,  posing a threat to the 
whole region.  
Recalling these failed attempts, then Turkish foreign minister had made clear that military 
solution will not pull off a triumph in Somalia state building and stabilization process.18 
Realizing the root cause of the Somali famine was the ineffectiveness of the state to provide 
the social services as a result of the decades of the civil war, Turkey, by coordinating its state 
and civil society institutions, has launched a broad range of humanitarian and development 
projects in Somalia, including state capacity building, infrastructure development and taking 
a mediation role in the political crises.  Erdogan and other Turkey’s top elites visited Somalia 
in 2011, to respond not only to the humanitarian tragedy, but also to focus the international 
attention to Somalia, despite the incessant security risks in Mogadishu. The visit has not only 
set a glimpse of hope for the Somalia people, but also has created a great transformation of 
the perception of the international community. Since then, the number of western embassies, 
and foreign dignities visiting the country have been increasing dramatically. Erdogan visited 
Somalia again in the early 2015 year, as another major boost for Somalia’s international 
profile.  In the following sections, the study discuses the findings of Turkey’s civilian power 
policy instruments to rebuild the Somali state. 
6.4. Political Process Support   
 
Realizing the magnitude of the Somalia’s state failure and the conflicting interest of both 
Somalia’s political the international actors, Turkey’s multidimensional approach to address 
the Somalia’s political and state building process has been effective in a number of areas. 
Beside attending the international conferences, organized by other states for Somalia, Turkey 
hosted several political conferences on Somalia’s state building process. Theses conference 
includes: the Istanbul conference (1&), which was held in 2010 and 2012 and participated by 
high level international officials and the Somalia leadership to discuss the Somalia future. 
The  outcome of these conferences, was the ending the period of the transitional government 
and the road map, to a permanent federal government with a new leadership, parliament and 
constitution. Turkey, has been successful in that sense of mobilizing the international 
community’s goals toward the Somalia state building, and post transition period. Another 
conference that Turkey initiated, was  the emergence ministerial-level of the Organization of 
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Islamic Cooperation conference in Istanbul on 17th August 2011, to raise awareness of the 
Somalia’s famine crises and seek a collective response. Thanks to Turkey’s initiative, the 
conference secured $350 pledged aid to support Somalia. Participated by the Then President 
Gul, the then prime minister, president Erdogan and then foreign minister, Prime Minster 
Davutoglu, showed the uniqueness sign of Turkey’s effort to boost the Somali case to the 
international level. The conference was intended for humanitarian purpose, however, it was 
another sign to draw attention to Somalia’s chronic problems, and seek a collective response 
to stabilize the country. 
 
Turkey, has also taken a mediation role in Somalia’s political rivalries, especially, 
Somaliland and the central government for several times.  The Turkish Foreign Ministry has 
played a great role in mediating both sides. For instance, the first talks in Ankara, after very 
touch negotiation and diplomacy involved in separate as well as trilateral meetings with then 
Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoğlu, then Prime Minister Erdoğan and then President Gül, 
the two Somali leaders agreed on Ankara Communiqué on 13th April 2013, to cooperate on 
security, social and economic areas and the continuation of the talks with the facilitation from 
the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The involvement of the Turkish prime ministry, the 
foreign ministry and the presidency in the talks, showed the significance that Turkey pays  to 
resolve the Somali political crises. So far, since the beginning of the talks in Turkey, both 
parties have agreed on many issues, including: the road map of the discussion, forming joint 
civil aviation administration team of Somalia’s airspace, sharing the international 
development assistance, security and intelligence information sharing on piracy and terrorism  
and the way forward of the future talks.  
 
Beside these proactive steps, Turkey has avoided to involve the local politics in the country. 
As an emerging actor in  the country and being not having a proxy in Somalia, many Somalis 
considered Turkey as an impartial actor in Somalia’ political process. Accordingly, a number 
of Somali scholars call Turkey to mediate talks between Al Shabab, which is posing a 
security threat to the country and the Somalia government. Speaking to Anadolu Agency, Sh. 
Bashir Ahmed Salad, the head of  the Council of Somali Scholars said, in referring to the 
country’s twenty years political crises: "I believe that Turkey, as a strong state, can find 
solutions to Somalia' s problems," (Anadolu Ajansi, 2013). Regarding Al Shabab, Sh. Bashir 
added that Turkey could play a mediating role between the government and the group, by 




difficult thing. Solving the crisis through peaceful and diplomatic means is possible," 
(Anadolu Ajansi, 2013), Salad said.  However, the study found out that there has been no 
such a move from Turkey to take the lead to mediate between the Somalia government and 
Al Shabab. Although Al Shabab is defeated in the southern Somalia, and has been loosing 
territories against the Somalia national army and AMISOM, however, the group is yet far 
from defeated, as they are changing their strategy and initiating asymmetric wars against the 
government. For that reason, there is high need to initiate talks with some of the group’s 
leaders with the government. On the other hand, Turkey, has enjoyed good relations with all 
actors of Somalia’s political process, including Somaliland; where even Turkey managed to 
open a consulate attached to its Mogadishu based embassy, in Hargeisa; the capital city of 
Somaliland, unlike any other country as Somaliland doesn’t countenance. As the country is 
yet divided into autonomous regions, Turkey, attempts to distribute its humanitarian and 
development to all regions without undermining the central government, and respecting the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Somalia. Generally, although it has taken great 
initiatives in Somalia’s political process, however, Turkey could have influenced the regional 
states, which have direct impact on Somalia’s stability, and also mediate between the 
government and Al Shabab, to effectively pursue its policies in Somalia. By using its 
humanitarian and development assistance, Turkey could have also influenced positively the 
conflicting interest of Somalia’s political actors to guide the process in the right direction, at 
times of political infighting. Therefore, we safely claim that Turkey was not effective enough 
to influence the political process, but was good to do some good initiatives.  
6.5. Peace Building Support 
 
As security is the main challenge Somalia is facing, Turkey has taken a clear policy regarding 
the peace building and restoring stability of the country, by investing in the Somalia security 
services. Turkey, while not having ground combat troops in Somalia, attempts to restructure 
and improve the capacity of security institutions. In this regard, Turkey and Somalia signed 
the first deal on military cooperation to support Somalia in areas of military logistics, peace 
support and providing training to the Somali forces at the Turkish military schools on task 
related courses, and on the job training at units, headquarters and institutions. To undertake 
the protocols signed by both governments, police and intelligence and military training have 
been carried out both in Somalia and Turkey. Regarding the police, for instance, the first 




16th July 2012 (Meydanistanbul, 2012). In Somalia, as part of its international police 
cooperation project, TIKA supported intelligence training to Somali police officers in 
Mogadishu (TIKA, 2012, p. 359) to enhance their knowledge and capacity to restore the 
stability of the city. Beside the police and the intelligence training, Turkey also supports the 
Somali armed forces, as a long term strategy of Somalia’s stability, while providing support 
to the African mission in Somalia. In 2013, for instance, the first batch of such series groups 
from the Somali army was transported to Turkey for a yearlong military training in the 
context of both countries’ signed protocols in cooperation of military training. As that was 
the first successful batch, currently 103 Somali military officials are in Turkey to be trained 
for land, sea and air defense (Radio Muqdisho, 2015). 
Another area, Turkey contributes significantly to the long term stability of Somalia is the 
rebuilding of the country’s security infrastructures to put up a home grown effective security 
services as these institutions had collapsed during the civil war. In this regard, to modernize 
the military, Turkey, allocated 20 million Turkish liras to the Somali army to build a new 
military academy, which will have the capacity to train 100 noncommissioned officers in the 
first stage, while professional military education of land, air and sea Schools foundations will 
be followed (Pressmedya, 2013). Regarding the police, after the attack on its embassy in 
2013, Turkey decided to establish a Police Academy in Somalia to increase the number and 
the quality of the Somali police forces (T24, 2013).  As 2 thousand and 400 police officers 
will be the first to be trained, the Academy will be the forefront in the fight against terrorism. 
In addition, Turkey also supports the Somalia coast guards, in 2013 for instance, Turkey 
provided 4 patrol boats to the Somalia Coast guard forces (Turkish Cooperation and 
Coordination Agency, 2013), to strengthen their capacity to protect against illegal fishing and 
piracy. 
Another area that Turkey contributed to the peace building in Somalia is the mobilizing and 
assembling the civil society toward Somalia’s future.  Generally, based on these efforts, the 
study found out that Turkey’s civilian hand in Somalia contributed significantly to the peace 
building process, as it had increased the quantity and the quality of the Somalia security 
forces. While also supporting AMISOM, Turkey heavily invested and gives priority to the 
rebuilding of the Somalia security services to establish a long term stability in the country. In 
this sense, the study can claim, that Turkey’s involvement in Somalia contributed positively 




6.6. Enhancing the capacity of State Institutions  
 
As the state institutions collapsed during the civil war, the Somalia government is also facing 
the challenge of rebuilding almost all state institutions. Institutions are crucial for the 
country’s good governance, stability and recovery from the years of anarchy. In this regard,  
Turkey has played a unique role in rebuilding the Somalia state institutions. The study found 
out that, most of the key Turkish government institution has partnered with its Somali 
counterparts to assist rebuild and provide expertise. Somalia has greatly benefited from this 
relationship of institution to institution, such as ministry to ministry, parliament to 
parliament, municipality to municipality, and chief to chief of staff. The state capacity 
building activities undertaken by Turkey in Somalia include: provision of training to the 
government personnel, equipping and rebuilding the infrastructure of the state institutions 
such as the government buildings, and financial support to the government.  
 
As the Turkish government institutions and NGOs involve in the support of almost every 
sector of the Somali state institutions,  the key areas include, first: Budget support. In 2013, 
the Turkish foreign ministry started a direct cash support to the Somali government. The $ 
4.5 million, as an aid package monthly payment (Keydmedia, 2014) was carried to Somalia 
through the Turkish embassy in Mogadishu. At the end of the 2013, as there were rumors 
published by some media outlets that Turkey had cut the direct cash, the Turkish Ministry of 
foreign affairs reaffirmed in a press statement the intention to continue the budget support for 
the year of 2014 (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014). The study hasn’t learned 
whether these supports have continued in 2015. However, the direct budget support has 
helped the Somali government to pay the salary of its public personnel on a regular base and 
carry out its state building activities. This kind of support is very crucial for Somalia, as the 
government still depends on international support. Second: building and equipping key 
government institutions is another key area of the Turkish state institutions and NGOs’s 
support to the Somali government to deliver social services. For instance, the Istanbul 
Municipality, TIKA and other Turkish institutions work with the Mogadishu Municipality to 
enhance its capacity in urban transformation and development, building key roads, and 
keeping the cleanliness of the city. The Turkish foreign ministry supports also the 
Information Technology infrastructures of the Somali Ministry of foreign Affairs. Since  
2013, Turkey has been supporting the Somalia ministry of foreign affairs to construct the 




communication between the ministry and its embassies in all of the all the world. Under the 
project, all kinds of hardware, software and training needs has been met by the Turkish 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Third: providing expertise and training is another key area of the 
Turkey’s building of Somali state institutions. Besides the provision of police and military 
training, Turkey also supports the Somalia government with training of its civil servants. A 
number of trainings have been carried out both in Somalia and Turkey. Most notably, 
employees from the Somalia presidency, ministry of foreign affairs, Mogadishu Municipality 
and other key government institutions have been brought to Turkey for a number of times. 
 
Generally speaking, the study found out that Somalia has greatly benefited from Turkey’s 
institutions to institution strategy to enhance the capacity of Somali state institutions, and this 
sense Turkey has been effective in this role of state building initiative.  
6.7. Developing Social Service Development 
 
Another area that Turkey greatly contributed to the stability of Somalia is the development of 
the social services. Owing to the lack of effective governments for over twenty years, the 
educational and health services in Somalia run mainly by private institutions with minor 
government guidance. Regarding the education, the Turkish NGOs and state institutions work 
closely with the Somali ministry education to improve the country’s educational systems. 
Many new schools have been constructed, others have been repaired, and the necessary 
technological equipment has been provided to the higher educational institutions. The 
schools, which was built or renovated by the Turkish state institutions or NGOs include, but 
not limited: Bedir Turkish secondary school, Anadolu Educational center, Sheikh Sufi Imam 
Hatip secondary school, Agriculture school, fishing school, and many other schools. To 
enhance the capacity of the higher education institutions in Somalia, TIKA has supported the 
universities and schools working in higher education with educational equipment and 
facilities. As the year of 2013, the total of computers donated by Turkey to priority regions of 
Somalia reached 600 (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency, 2013, p. 108). In 
addition, Turkey implemented vocational centers in Somalia to train the young people and 
equip them with the necessary equipment. In addition to the schools, many Turkish state 
institutions and NGOs have provided a huge number of scholarships to the Somalis students. 
In the first two years of Turkey’s involvement in Somalia, nearly $70 million has been 




while the number has been increasing for the last years. This study haven’t ascertain the exact 
number of Somalis studying with scholarships in Turkey as that because many of the small 
NGOs and charities who bring the students in different periods, lack a recorded data which 
makes hard to identify  the total number of the students and the level of their studies. 
However, and according to the recorded data, a total of 1979 Somali students are currently 
studying in Turkey with full scholarship, some of these students are University level students 
while many more are high school students. Beside the full scholarships provided to study in 
Turkey, there are semiannual and annual scholarship programs granted, for instance, in 2012, 
400 lower-secondary and secondary Somalis students were hosted in Turkey for 1 year of 
education (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency, 2012, p. 25).  
 
Regarding the health service, Turkey has done an enormous job, as Turkey’s assistance in 
Somalia, is more visible in the health sector than any other. New hospitals and nursing 
schools have been built, while others have been renovated; great number of Turkish doctors 
has visited Somalia to assist, while many Somali students have been brought to Turkey for 
medical education and training. The hospitals built or renovated include, but not limited to: 
the 200-bed Somalia-Turkey Research and Training Hospital, which is the most modern 
hospital in East Africa, The 100-bed Mother and Child Hospital, The 62-bed Shifa Hospital, 
and the 50-bed Deva International Training and Research Hospital, the Barbara Hospital, The 
Galkayo hospital and the 40 classrooms School of nursing in Mogadishu. In addition to the 
hospitals there are other field hospitals built by either Turkish NGOs or supported by Turkish 
state institutions.  Beside the hospitals, several training programs have been conducted both 
in Somalia and Turkey. 
 
To sum up, in according to the founded results, Turkey has been very effective and have done 
enormous effort to support and develop the social services of Somalia. Both its NGOs and 
state institutions have contributed immensely, and this is sector is the most visible, in 
according to its various activities in the country. 
6.8. Economic Infrastructure Development  
 
Turkey has bombed millions of dollars of humanitarian and development aid in Somalia since 
2011. By working inside, and massively investing in economic infrastructures, the Turkish 




the direct correlation between development aid, and the reduction of violence, Turkey spent 
millions of dollars to stabilize the country. In 2011, about 30% of the Turkey’s international 
aid provided by public institutions was turned towards Somalia, receiving $77.72m, 
becoming number one, (Turkish Development and Coordination Agency, 2011, p. 11). In 
2011, Somalia was also the largest aid recipient from the Turkish NGOs’ international aid, 
receiving $57.84m (Turkish Development and Coordination Agency, 2011, p. 70). In the 
2012, Somalia maintained in the top second of Turkey’s international development 
assistance, by receiving $ 47.54 million, (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency, 
2012, p. 53), after Syrian due to the outbreak of civil war in Syrian, but maintained to be the 
largest aid recipient of Turkish NGOs’ international assistance (Turkish Cooperation and 
Coordination Agency, 2012, p. 78). In 2013, Turkey invested $115.74 million of 
development aid, (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency, 2013, p. 66), in Somalia 
by constructing hospitals and roads. These huge investments have relieved Somalia to 
quickly recover from the famine and created hope. 
 
While there have been international humanitarian actors in Somalia for the last twenty years, 
however, the Turkish engagement was seen as critical to lower the famine and making 
deference in the country. The international community  had spent over $55bn since 1991 for 
humanitarian and peacekeeping missions in Somalia (Norris & Bruton, 2011, p. 1), without 
yielding the desired results intended for these funds, while Turkeys have spent less than 
$500m with huge impact. Another key difference between Turkish and other humanitarian 
actors in Somalia is the understanding of the ‘humanitarian’ concept. The Turkish concept of 
humanitarian is much broader than the universally accepted humanitarian definition. Saving 
lives and alleviating suffering of crisis-affected populations is the internationally accepted 
concept of humanitarian response, However, the Turkish understanding of the concept is 
much broader than that by including the sense of human sympathy to its humanitarian 
assistance (Binder & Erten, 2013, p. 7), which even combines the development assistance as 
motivated by the concept of human sympathy, (Binder & Erten, 2013, p. 7). Explaining 
Turkey’s humanitarian approach in Somalia, then prime minister Bekir Bozdag said: 
“Turkey’s efforts [in Somalia] are thoroughly humanitarian. […]. I am concerned 
with humanitarian concerns of Somalis as much as with those of the people of my 
hometown Yozgat. […]. We deal with Somalia’s hunger, health, education issues as a 
humanitarian duty and a responsibility driven by our conscience.” (Binder & Erten, 





This broader notion has assisted Somalia to recover slowly due to the massive investment 
projects coming from Turkey in the name of humanity. For instance, while many 
international humanitarian organizations were busy providing basic services in Somalia, the 
Turkish state institutions and NGOs were building roads, hospital, schools and other 
development projects beside the humanitarian operations as part of human sympathy.  
 
While Turkey’s humanitarian and development aid to Somalia, are mainly coordinated in 
Mogadishu; the country’s capital city, however, today, the footprint of the Turkish projects 
could be seen in every corner of the country, if it is constructing a school, hospital or 
economic infrastructure development. As the country is yet divided into between autonomous 
regions and militant Islamist group like Al Shabab, Turkey extended economic assistance to 
all regions as a sign of impartiality from political rivalries. The Turkish ambassador in 
Mogadishu visited the major cities in the country such as Hargeisa, Growe, Kismayo and 
Baidoa and the Turkish state institutions NGOs expanded their operations in the country. 
TIKA has implemented development and humanitarian projects Hargeisa, Barbara; 
Somaliland, Galkayo; Puntaland and Mogadishu in southern Somalia. Explaining Turkey’s 
impartiality, then deputy prime minister said in 2013: “This attention is not at all political. 
We are neither close to, nor far from any sides in Somalia. While holding equal distance to 
all, we deal with Somalia’s hunger, health, education issues as a humanitarian duty and a 
responsibility driven by our conscience.” (Binder & Erten, 2013, p. 8). 
 
Years without functioning government, the Somalia people; who are known with their 
exceptional entrepreneurship skills, managed to revive the country’s economy by creating 
intra and international business despite the security challenge. As the role of the state in the 
country’s economy has been limited, the key economic infrastructures left without 
development for a long time. For that reason, the development aids that Turkey has been 
bombing in Somalia went mainly to infrastructure development. Turkey sent at least 50 
construction machines and trucks to Mogadishu (Anadolu Ajansi, 2012), to be used for 
infrastructure development and have constructed a concrete plant; a cobblestone production 
facility and stone crusher unit, to meet the material need for road construction 
(Turkish Red Crescent, 2015). The Turkish infrastructure development activities in Somali 
include: First: Mogadishu Friendship Road. As promised by then Prime Minister, President 




30m width, which connects the airport to the city center as one of the most important roads in 
the city, and installed 736 new lighting posts. 
 
Second: Mogadishu international airport and port. Although currently the airport is under the 
administration of Turkish company, which completed the construction of a new terminal, 
however, the airport had missed some necessary equipment to work as international airport 
ahead of Turkish involvement in Somalia in 2011. Thanks to the renovations made by the 
Turkish General Directorate of State Airports Authority, and TIKA, the International Civil 
Aviation Organization removed the airport from ‘Zone 5’ list of airports deemed to pose a 
security risk to aircraft, crew and passengers, On the other hand, TIKA is currently carrying 
out on the reconstruction of the Somali civil aviation school, (TIKA, 2015, p. 34), which is 
significant to enhancing the capacity of the personnel and the smooth running of the Somali 
airports. Generally, the study found out that Turkey’s huge economic investment and 
development aid has assisted not only to create jobs, but also encouraged the diaspora and 
foreigners to invest in, which also plays a critical role in the stability of the country.  
 
In conclusion, based on the above findings, the study safely argues that Turkey’s civilian 
power approach to Somalia has a positive impact to the country’s state building and 
stabilization process. Though the impact varies, however, Turkey’s involvement has 
contributed positively to the process of peace building, political process, enhancing state 






This study was set out to explore and determine the role of the Turkish civilian power in 
Somalia state building and stabilization process. Particularly, the study has sought to know 
the sound effects of the Turkey’s civilian approach in Somalia’s peace building, political 
process, enhancing state capacity, and socioeconomic developments.  The study has also 
sought to know whether a civilian power intervention could stabilize Somalia and play a role 
in the country’s state building process. The study sought to answer two of these questions: 1. 
Do Turkey’s civilian power intervention in Somalia has yielded positive impact on the 
Somali state building? 2. Based on the findings of the first question, and the general literature 
of the Somalia state building context, the study, asks to answer, does the civilian power 
approach to stabilize Somalia be a pattern to consider for state building and stabilization of 
the country?.  
Thus, the study recognized that Turkey’s post-2011 strategy to rebuild the Somali state was 
quite unlikely to many other international actor’s approaches to stabilize Somalia; a process 
that has been going for the last two decades. Instead, by using diplomacy to mediate, 
bombing humanitarian and development assistance to support recovery from the economic 
hardships, building the state through infrastructure and institutional development, employing 
a multidemnsional approach to support the political process, and building an indiginous 
security services as an enduring succees for Somali’s peace building,  Turkey undertook a 
civilian power policy instrument to avoid involving in direct military conflict and taking an 
impartial choice from the political rivalries.  By coordinating its state and civil society 
institutions, Turkey has played a role in rebuilding the Somalia state institutions in a way that 
contributes to the stability of the country.  
In the view of the findings, the study argues, that Turkey’s civilian power approach to 
Somalia has a positive impact to the country’s state building and stabilization process. This 
means, that Turkey’s involvement has contributed positively to the process of peace building, 
political process, enhancing state capacity institutions and building socioeconomic services of 
the country. Despite the study’s argument of Turkish civilian power’s approach to Somali 
state building, more research is a need to develop  achievable policy strategies with regard to 
civilian powers’ intervention in fragile and failed states. For that reason, there is a need for 




intervention contributes significantly to the stabilization of these countries, and specifically 
the Somalia case, how it contribute to the reunification and state building of the country, 







1. After two decades of conflict and state failure, the international community must 
consider, and rethink past strategies and policies employed toward stabilizing 
Somalia. While hard power and military policy instruments have already used, the 
international community should look a civilian power approach to resolve the conflict 
and salvage this war torn country. 
2. Since Somalia’s neighbors have their fears of strong and united Somalia, and they 
have a direct impact to the stabilization of this country, Turkey, by using its influence 
to these countries, should consider seriously a regional approach and regional 
ownership to effectively implement its strategic policies toward the Somalia state 
building process.  
3. As Somalia is located in a significant strategic place in the Horn of Africa, Turkey 
should be careful about the suspicion of the regional and the international actors from 
its rising role in the country, assuring its support to Somalia state building would not 
produce a geopolitical rivalry, which could hinder the effectiveness of its actions in 
Somalia. 
4. Turkey should also sell and convince its civilian power policy toward Somalia, to 
other international actors involved in Somalia. For instance, in spite of investing 
foreign troops to stabilize the country, Turkey should persuade other actors, that 
building the Somalia’s army would yield an enduring success against Al Shabab, and 
restore law and order in the country. 
5. Turkey should clearly monitor, and evaluate its policies in Somalia over the past three 
years, to come up a more comprehensive plan for a sustainable foreign policy toward 
Somalia and the East African region. 
6. As suggested by a number of Somali scholars, Turkey, should take a leading role in 
mediating between the Somalia government and those in Al Shabab, denouncing 
violence, to come up a viable solution for the peace building and political process in 
Somalia.  
7. To keep its image in Somalia, Turkey should be careful about the conflicting interests 
of Somalia’s political actors, by using its humanitarian and development aid to all 




8. While Turkish policies have had success in a number of areas, more focus should be 
placed on economic initiatives, as these directly effect to reduce the poverty, and lease 
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Appendix 1: Ankara Communique, 13 April 2013  
Following the meeting at Chevening House (UK) of June 20-21, 2012 and the Dubai 
(UAE) of June 28, 2012, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud of the Somali Federal 
Republic and President Ahmed Mohamed Silanyo of Somaliland Government met on 13 
April 2013 in Ankara. 
 
The meeting is hosted by the Government of Turkey at the request of the two parties. 
 
The purpose of this meeting is to reopen the dialogue after the change in the leadership 
of the Somali Federal Republic, and to establish a way forward for the dialogue. 
 
The two parties:  
 
1. Expressed their commitment to the continuation of the Dialogue. 
 
2. Endorsed the content of the Chevening house Declaration agreed on 21 June 2012, 
and the Dubai Statement signed on 28 June 2012. 
 
3. Stated that the Dialogue is between the Federal Government of Somalia and the 
Government of Somaliland. The international community that is supporting this process 
will only provide facilitation when is needed. 
 
4. Agreed to encourage and facilitate International aid and development provided to 
Somaliland.  
 
5. Agreed the need to consolidate a cooperation on security sector through sharing 
intelligence, training as well as sharing scholarships for security sector professionals in 
order to become more effective in the fight against terrorism, extremism, piracy, illegal 
fishing toxic dumping, maritime crime and serious crime.  
 
6. Proposed to meet within 90 days in Istanbul at a date later to be agreed by the parties.  
 
7. Agreed to refrain from using any inflammatory language and any other act which may 
put the continuation of the Dialogue at risk.  
 
H.E.  Abdikarim H. Guled                               H.E. Mohamed A. Omar 
Minister                                                              Minister 
 




Appendix 2:  Istanbul Declaration, Istanbul, Turkey - 22 May 2010  
 
The Istanbul Conference on Somalia took place in Istanbul from 21-23 May, 2010 reflecting 
the 
strong determination of the United Nations, the Government of Turkey and the International 
Community to work with the Transitional Federal Institutions and the people of Somalia to 
defeat the cycle of lawlessness, violence and despair in the country and to build in its place a 
peaceful and prosperous future for the Somali people. The Conference reaffirmed the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of Somalia.   
 
The Conference was held within the framework of the Djibouti Agreement, which provides 
Somalia and its leaders with a clear and viable path for achieving a comprehensive and 
lasting settlement of the situation in Somalia.  The Djibouti Process remains open for all 
Somalis to work towards peace, reconciliation and development. The Conference expressed 
its full support to President Sheikh Sharif Ahmed and the Transitional Federal Institutions in 
their efforts to implement the Djibouti Agreement. It reiterated its commitment to improve 
the lives and security of the Somali people, foster reconciliation, human rights and good 
governance, increase access to basic services, initiate reconstruction activities and set 
Somalia firmly on the path to peace and sustainable development.  
 
The Conference noted the existence of several outstanding commitments made in previous 
forums on Somalia and urged the Transitional Federal Institutions and the International 
Community to implement them. The Conference placed particular emphasis on the urgency 
for the Transitional Federal Government to address its considerable political, economic and 
security challenges. It also encouraged the private sector to play a positive role in 
strengthening peace and stability.  
 
1.    The Conference Recognized that: 
  
 Somalia’s people and leaders face a determined effort, fuelled by internal and external 
interference, to hinder social, economic and political progress. Overcoming the current 
hardships and insecurity will require a determined, long-term effort to promote political 




influence of those profiting from the conflict, as well as the presence of foreign fighters and 
other elements of extremism.   
 
 It is important that the Djibouti Peace Process and transition are kept on track. The 
successful  implementation of the Djibouti Agreement demands the rejection of violence and 
extremism; continued outreach and political reconciliation with those outside the peace 
process who accept dialogue. The Conference welcomed progress made by the Transitional 
Federal Government in this regard, as illustrated by its agreement with Ahlu Sunna Wal 
Jama’a in March 2010, and a security accord related to countering piracy with the Puntland 
region in April 2010 and on bilateral cooperation in August 2008. The Conference 
encouraged Puntland to continue maintaining its stability and political cooperation with the 
TFG. It welcomed the current democratization process in “Somaliland” and urged for 
peaceful completion of its upcoming elections in a transparent manner.  
 
 Somalia needs to establish loyal and professional security forces with a strong and unified 
command and control structure and reintegrate those armed groups that have joined the TFG. 
The re-establishment, training, equipping, payment and retention of Somali security forces is 
vital for the long-term stability of Somalia. The Conference commended all those Member 
States and international organizations providing training for the Somalia security forces. It 
emphasized the importance of coordinated, timely and sustained support from the 
international community and appealed for the prompt and timely disbursement of funds 
pledged in support of the Somali security institutions. In addition, the Conference welcomed 
the increased number of trained Somali recruits, as well as the senior Transitional Federal 
Government military appointments which will significantly enhance the command and 
control structure.  
 
 Somalia’s reconstruction and development can only be realised when governmental  
institutions, the business sector, civil society, women, the Diaspora and the international 
community work together in an effective and coherent manner. Recovery activities can make 
a greater contribution to social, economic and cultural development in Somalia, through 
further investment, continued employment-creation and training.  The Conference encourages 
focus on the six initial priority areas identified by the Transitional Federal Government and 




fisheries, banking and remittances and; alternative energy. In particular it called for support 
to fund the completion of Bossaso and Garowe airports. 
  
 It is critical to have a renewed emphasis on Somalia’s economic recovery and 
development. The Conference committed itself to work towards concrete action plans which 
would include identifying pilot projects for private-public investment with a view to creating 
economic zones.  
 
 The Conference welcomed the discussion among the business community, the United 
Nations and development partners and the Transitional Federal Government on the margins 
of the Conference regarding the “Principles for an enabling Environment for Responsible 
Business Activities in Somalia”.  The Conference recognized the need to develop business-
friendly conditions that would benefit the entire population. It looks forward to further 
consideration of a business Compact for Somalia.  
 
 The Transitional Federal Government, in partnership with the international community 
has a 
major responsibility to respond to the humanitarian suffering of the Somali people. The 
Transitional Federal Government must discharge its responsibilities to assure safe access to 
vulnerable populations, deliver basic services, manage public resources wisely and ensure a 
just distribution of revenues; introduce anti-corruption measures, develop and support the 
private sector; and build the capacity of its financial institutions. The international 
community should continue its support to the Somali people. The Conference accepted that 
the reconstruction outcome of the Istanbul Conference will complement existing 
humanitarian assistance activities and will not prejudice efforts to organize a more 
comprehensive development and reconstruction conference at a later stage.   
 
2. The Conference:   
 
 Commended the contribution of the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) to 
lasting peace and stability in Somalia and expressed appreciation for the continued 
commitment of troops and equipment to AMISOM by the Governments of Burundi and 
Uganda and AMISOM Police Contributing Countries- Burundi, Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra 




Transitional Federal Institutions. The Conference also called on other African countries to 
provide troops to AMISOM to reach its mandated strength.  It appreciated financial support 
to AMISOM by the international community and stressed the need for predictable, reliable 
and timely provision of resources to the AU by all partners. In this regard, the Conference 
called for the expeditious disbursement of all pledges made at the Brussels Pledging 
Conference held on 23 April 2009. 
  
 Took note of the important role of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development 
(IGAD), 
and Somalia’s neighbours in promoting peace, security and development in Somalia and the 
region. It re-affirmed the principles of good neighbourly relations and urged Somalia’s 
partners to continue to support effort towards this end.  
 
 The conference welcomed the decision of the Summit of the League Arab States held in 
Sirte in March 2010, to convene a conference on Boosting early recovery activities for 
Somalia, in the next few months. It expressed its appreciation for the determination of the 
Arab League to build on the spirit and results of the Ðstanbul Conference, and to prepare its 
conference in full cooperation with the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia, the 
Republic of Turkey, the African Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development 
(IGAD), United Nations and the Organization of Islamic Conference.   
 
 Expressed its grave concern over the increase in acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea 
against vessels off the coast of Somalia. Noted with appreciation the assistance being 
provided by the United Nations and other international organizations and donors, in 
coordination with the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (“CGPCS”), to 
enhance the capacity of the judicial and the corrections systems in Somalia, Kenya, 
Seychelles and other States in the region to prosecute suspected, and imprison convicted, 
pirates consistent with applicable international human rights law. In this regard, it welcomed  
the establishment of the International Trust Fund supporting initiatives of the Contact Group 
on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia to defray the expenses associated with prosecution of 
suspected pirates and to support other counter-piracy initiatives and welcomed Member 
States and other potential donors to contribute to the fund. Also commended the efforts of 
other States to prosecute suspected pirates in their national courts and appealed to other States 




applicable international law, including human rights law. It also expressed appreciation for 
the role of the EU operation Atalanta, North Atlantic Treaty Organization operations Allied 
Protector and Ocean Shield and Combined Maritime Forces’ Combined Task Force 151, in 
the fight against piracy off the Coast of Somalia.  
 
3. The Transitional Federal Government reaffirmed: 
  
 Its primary responsibility to provide security to the people of Somalia by increasing the 
number of trained Somali recruits, ensuring integration of all security forces , including those 
of the Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama’a and improving the control and command structure of the 
Somali Forces.  
 
 Its commitment to continue its outreach, dialogue and reconciliation efforts, implementing  
concrete collaboration with Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama’a and extending partnerships with regional 
and local administrations.   
  
 Its commitment to avoid internal disputes so that they will not hinder the work of the 
Transitional Federal Institutions and delivery of services to its people. This also entails 
working to strengthen its governance structures, ensure transparency and accountability and 
efficient functioning of the Transitional Federal Institutions. 
  
 Its efforts to seek innovative ways to engage with the Somali people to draft the Somali 
Federal Constitution. The TFG confirmed that a fully inclusive and consultative process 
would be advanced by the third quarter of 2010. It is also crucial for the TFG to take 
ownership of the tasks necessary to facilitate the full implementation of the transitional 
arrangement;  
 
The Istanbul Conference has reaffirmed the world’s commitment to Somalia and its rejection 
of all efforts to sow violence and instability in the country.  We send a clear and strong 
message to the people of Somalia that they are not alone in the search for peace, 
reconciliation and prosperity after so many years of poverty, hardship and suffering.  With 
determined efforts by, the Transitional Federal Institutions, Somali civil society and the 
private sector, in partnership with the international community, a bright future for Somalia is 





The Conference took note that the Government of Spain will host the next high-level 
International Contact Group Meeting in Madrid in September 2010. The Conference 
expressed its deep appreciation to the Government and people of Turkey for hosting the 
Istanbul Conference which is a significant contribution to the efforts towards achieving 
peace, security and development in Somalia.  
                                                       




Appendix 3: The Second İstanbul Conference on Somalia, Final 
Declaration, 1 June 2012, İstanbul 
1. The Second Istanbul Conference on Somalia, under the theme “Preparing Somalia’s 
Future: Goals for 2015,” took place on 31st May and 1st June 2012. Maintaining the multi-
dimensional and multi-layered approach of the first Istanbul Conference in 2010 on Somalia, 
it was attended by high level representatives from 57 countries and 11 international and 
regional organizations, as well as by the TFG leadership, the regional administrations, and 
representatives from wide-ranging segments of Somali society, including youth, women, 
business community, elders, religious leaders and the Diaspora.  
 
Introduction  
2. The Conference reaffirmed its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political 
independence and unity of Somalia. It agreed that for genuine peace to take hold in Somalia, 
Somali people should seek dialogue, reconciliation and political cooperation including in 
establishing inclusive, accountable and legitimate governance. The Conference is grateful for 
the wide-scale and strong Somali participation, including women, in this Conference, and the 
powerful and meaningful messages they have pronounced.  
 
3. The Conference noted that at this critical period in Somalia’s history, the security, political, 
social and economic achievements of the past year have given Somalis and the international 
community a renewed hope for the future. Somalia has made considerable progress towards 
achieving stability, security and reconciliation: this opportunity should not be missed. The 
Conference emphasized that August 2012 is the beginning of a new phase of peace-building, 
in which all Somalis would contribute to peace and have their voices heard.  
 
4. The Conference highlighted that primary responsibility for establishing a political solution 
in the country lies with Somalis. The role of the international community is to support 
Somalis to provide leadership and ownership in rebuilding a functioning state and local 
governments that can provide security, ensure the rule of law and respect for human rights, 
provide basic social services and create an enabling environment that allows for economic 





5. It reconfirmed the importance of the London Conference that constituted a milestone in 
gathering the international momentum on Somalia, and pledged to ensure a continued 
coherent and cooperative international approach.  
 
Political  
6. The Conference reiterated that the transitional period will come to an end in August 2012 
in accordance with the Kampala Accord, the Roadmap, the Garowe I and II Principles, the 
Galkayo Agreement and re-affirmed commitment made by the Signatories to the Roadmap 
through the Addis Ababa Communique. It called for the timely implementation of these 
decisions and delivery of pledged funds. The Conference commended the convening of the 
Traditional Elders in Mogadishu who are carrying out their task of selecting the members of 
the Constituent Assembly and the new Parliament. It welcomed their efforts to ensure that 
women meaningfully participate in the process and constitute 30% of the Constituent 
Assembly and the new Parliament and the role of women is enshrined in the constitution. 
  
7. The Conference welcomed the intention that the Constituent Assembly adopts the 
provisional constitution of Somalia. It highlighted the importance of Somali ownership of the 
constitution through a public debate and future adoption through a referendum. The 
Conference also commended the ongoing public consultations and civic education process in 
order to allow the Somali people to have their voices heard and participate in the political 
process. The Conference urged the Roadmap signatories to expand this effort to include 
newly recovered areas. 
8. The Conference expressed the firm expectation that the selection process of the leaner and 
more representative Federal Parliament is completed in a fair and transparent way without 
any hindrance and that the elections for the positions of Speaker (and Deputies), and 
President by the new Parliament are carried out smoothly by 20 August 2012.  
9. The Participants reiterated their firmness in not allowing internal and external actors or 
groups to disrupt the smooth implementation of the end of the Transition. In this context, they 
commended the joint AU-IGAD-UN letter of May 2012 to such potential actors in Somalia. 
They agreed to consider appropriate follow-up action against those judged to be blocking 





10. The Conference reiterated the crucial need for the international community to support 
dialogue that Somaliland and the TFG have agreed to pursue.  
11. The Participants looked forward to the beginning of a new political dispensation, with a 
new Parliament and Government, and emphasized the importance of those institutions 
coming to fruition through a more representative, transparent and legitimate process.  
12. In keeping with the London Communique, the Conference reiterated that respect for 
human rights must be at the heart of the peace process. It welcomed the Memorandum of 
Understanding signed between the Transitional Federal Government and the United Nations 
on 11 May 2012, and called on the Somali authorities to follow through with their 
commitment to uphold human rights and the rule of law, and put an end to the culture of 
violence and impunity, and bring about accountability. The Conference called for all parties 
to commit themselves to transitional justice mechanisms in the Post-Transition period.  
13. The Conference emphasized that in the post-Transition period, the new political 
dispensation in Somalia must begin with a new program aimed at re-establishing of state and 
local institutions and administrative structures, based on and complementary to the current 
Roadmap including the newly recovered areas.  
14. The Conference noted need to adjust international support to the political structures in 
Somalia and called on the UN to review the shape of its future engagement in Somalia.  
Security and Justice. 
 15. The Conference agreed on the need to revitalize funding arrangements. The Conference 
took note of the proposal for the establishment of a new “Rebuilding and Restructuring Fund 
for the Somali Security Sector” initiated by Turkey to offer additional support to the Somali 
security forces.  
16. The Conference recognized the need for the international community to continue to 
support the re-establishment of a professional, inclusive, disciplined and well-equipped 
security apparatus, including the Somali national army, police, navy, coastguard and 
intelligence agencies, as well as mechanisms to ensure civilian oversight of the security 
sector. The Conference emphasized the urgency to approve and implement the National 
Security and Stabilization Plan and the need to bring all Somali forces under a unified 
command. In this context, it recognized the significant contributions that the EU, including 




security sector institutions. The Conference encouraged broader support to these institutions.  
17. The Conference commended the ongoing support of the international community for 
AMISOM, particularly by the United Nations, the European Union, IGAD member-states and 
the US and other bilateral partners. The Conference called on new donors to provide financial 
support to AMISOM troops including salaries, entitlements, reimbursement of contingent-
owned equipment (COE), and enabling assets.  
18. The Conference praised the efforts of the African Union through AMISOM and 
particularly those of Uganda and Burundi who have made troop contributions to AMISOM, 
and looking forward to the completion of troop deployments from Djibouti, Sierra Leone and 
Kenya. Today AMISOM, alongside its Somali Security Force allies is the main military 
instrument in ensuring security and stability in Somalia. We emphasized that the TFG and 
AMISOM have to be strongly supported by the international community at this critical 
juncture to meet objectives.  
19. The Conference agreed that insecurity in Somalia, including sustained inter clan conflict, 
persistent violence, illegal charcoal trading, misappropriation of funds, piracy, kidnapping, 
terrorism and human rights abuses and violations, is exacerbated by the crisis emanating from 
the deficiency of the state structures and institutions in large parts of the country. It 
condemned all acts of violence against civilians, including journalists, and humanitarian 
workers in violation of international humanitarian law and human rights law.  
20. The Conference reiterated its commitment to coordinate its efforts in support to the 
security and justice sectors through a re-invigorated Joint Security Committee and its 
technical working groups and looked forward to discussing proposals in this regard.  
21. The Conference reiterated the need for effective rule of law institutions. The Conference 
stressed the importance of a broad consultative process in developing a plan to strengthen 
justice and correctional institutions and called for the establishment of a task force consisting 
of the TFG and international partners. 
 22. The Conference rejected all forms of terrorism, violations of human rights and violent 
extremism which endanger the lives of the Somali people, as well as regional and 
international peace. The Somali population has suffered a great deal at the hands of violent 
extremists and participants agreed to work together to help build capacity to confront the root 




Somalia. It agreed to work with the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum and other international 
and regional bodies to deliver this important work. 
 23. It condemned the use of child soldiers and sexual violence by the combatant sides. The 
Conference also deplored the recent attacks against journalists. Those who are responsible 
must be held to account. The Conference called on all Somalis to renounce unlawful acts of 
violence, to operate within a constitutional framework and to support the ongoing political 
process. Those who refuse to do so, and instead engage in or support violence and crime, 
should be dissuaded, isolated, or otherwise prevented from derailing the Roadmap and the 
process of Somali reconciliation and state-building. The Conference resolved to develop 
further a programme to support those who renounce violence.  
24. The Conference reiterated that the problem of piracy off the coast of Somalia requires a 
comprehensive approach on land as well as at sea that addresses the root causes of the 
phenomenon and combines development, capacity-building, rule of law, deterrence and 
prosecution on the basis of UNSC Resolution 2020 (2011) and full compliance of 
international law. It called for the reinforcement of Somali-owned judicial capacities. The 
Conference looks forward to discussing the issue of piracy in depth and at length during the 
UAE’s Second High Level Piracy Conference “A Regional Response to Maritime Piracy: 
Enhancing Public Private Partnership and strengthening global engagement to be held in 
Dubai on 27-28 June 2012 and the International Piracy Conference to be held in Perth, 
Australia on 15-17 July, 2012. The Conference further supports the ongoing work of the 
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, including its forthcoming 12th Plenary 
Meeting to be held in New York on 25 July 2012.  
Local stability  
25. The Conference recognized that the Somali leaders with the support of the international 
community face a huge challenge in ensuring a stable and secure environment in the 
recovered areas as soon as possible. A power vacuum must not be allowed to develop in 
those areas.  
26. We took note of the work undertaken by the TFG and local governance structures to 
promote stabilization and reconciliation in the newly recovered regions in Somalia. We 
welcomed the establishment of the National Policy for Reconciliation and Stabilization in 
these areas and noted the need for continued political cooperation, through a transparent and 




Conference further takes note of the TFG national reconciliation and stabilization plan for the 
newly recovered areas and urges regional and international partners, including AU, IGAD 
and the UN to support this comprehensive plan.  
27. The Conference called upon the international community to consider further ways and 
means of stabilizing and securing emerging areas of stability and sustaining these through 
governance programs. The Stability Fund established at the London Conference shall serve 
this purpose and thus should be supported Economic Development and Recovery. 
 28. The Conference recognized the continued fragility of the humanitarian situation. With 
international support in the summer of 2011, Somalia was able to overcome the famine and 
avoid further exacerbation of the humanitarian crisis. However, more than 2.5 million 
Somalis remain in crisis and the risk of a further deterioration persists. The Conference called 
for immediate, unhindered access to all populations in need, respecting agreed humanitarian 
principles.  
29. The Conference recognized the primary role of the Somali authorities as well as the 
important role of the international community in assisting Somalis in strengthening resilience. 
The Conference welcomed the Partnership Forum’s efforts to build consensus on preventive 
and preemptive policies in this regard, and pledged to continue the dialogue.  
 
30. The Conference underlined the importance of finding durable solutions for refugees and 
internally displaced persons (IDPs). It stressed in particular that protection of civilians in 
accordance with international humanitarian and refugee law must be maintained at all times 
by all parties.  
31. The Conference recognized the need for a new phase in the approach to Somalia’s 
economic recovery.  
32. The Conference underscored its belief that without special and equal emphasis on the 
reconstruction area, work in other spheres would be incomplete. Starting to rebuild Somalia’s 
infrastructure in Mogadishu and other areas will contribute to Somalis’ confidence in their 
future and constitute an incentive and encouragement for all segments of Somalia to 
reconcile.  
 
33. Following the outcomes of the working groups on the first Istanbul Conference on 




attended by participants from Government, international organizations, donors, civil society 
and the private sector. It stressed that large-scale multi-year predictable financing was 
urgently needed both for infrastructure projects and to enhance the resilience of Somali 
communities. The Conference recognized the importance of harnessing the skills and 
capacity of the private sector and the Somali diaspora (Please see Annex 1.)  
34. The Conference noted the importance of creating the right investment climate and agreed 
that offering conditional investment guarantees will provide a strong incentive for economic 
development with equity.  
35. The Conference emphasized the importance of encouraging equitable growth to reduce 
poverty and deprivation in Somalia including through the promotion of inclusive business 
practices and service provision. Participants agreed on the need for capacity building in the 
public and private sectors. It was noted that institutional development was needed to ensure 
government can establish a socially responsible and business-friendly regulatory 
environment. They recognized the importance of diversification of energy sources, 
improvements in the quality and scope of the transport infrastructure in a way that supports 
economic development and investment in urban water supply, rural water supply, water 
resource management and water governance.  
36. The Conference resolved to continue the discussion through further public-private 
dialogue, supported by the United Nations as well as the Istanbul International Centre for 
Private Sector in Development.  
37. The Conference welcomed ongoing negotiations to establish a mutual accountability 
regime built around the proposed Joint Financial Management Board (JFMB). It urged the 
early conclusion of the negotiations establishing the JFMB and noted that the international 
community remains committed to helping Somalia better regulate its finances and 
development assistance.  
38. The Conference welcomes the establishment of a multi-donor Trust Fund for post-
Transition financing.  
Conclusion  
39. The Conference expected the ICG to be held in Rome on 2-3 July to take stock of the 






40. The Conference commended the UN, the African Union, the IGAD, the EAC, the EU, the 
OIC and League of Arab States, and other bilateral partners for their relentless efforts in 
stabilizing Somalia. It welcomed the relocation of UNPOS and encouraged the UN to 
continue to relocate staff inside Somalia. Donors are encouraged to support this. The 





Appendix 3: Final Communique: Emergency Ministerial-Level Meeting of the OIC 
Executive Committee on Somalia Convened in Istanbul on Wednesday 17/8/l20ll 
1. At the kind invitation of the Government of the Republic of Turkey an Emergency 
Ministerial-level Meeting of the OIC Executive Committee on Somalia convened in 
Istanbul, Turkey on 17"' August 2011 to appraise the escalating humanitarian 
situation and to consider perlinent intervention measures to alleviate the plight of the 
famineaffected people in Somalia, under the umbrella of the OIC. 
 
2. The meeting listened to the important speeches of H.E. the President of Somalia; 
H.E.the Prime Minister of Turkey, H.E. the Chairman of the Council of Foreign 
Ministers, and H.E. the OIC Secretary General, and interventions of parlicipants, and 
was also briefed on the measures so far taken by the Organization of Islamic 
Cooperation in coordination with its parlners on the ground in Somalia. 
 
3.  The meeting was well briefed on the humanitarian crisis affecting 12 million people 
in the Horn of Africa, with over 4 million people in Somalia, and drew the conclusion 
that the vulnerable people in the region affected by the current drought, which has 
culminated into fullblown famine, are desirous of urgent joint humanitarian action 
humanitarian as any fufther delay will endanger the lives of thousands of people, 
especially children, and therefore called upon all OIC Member States, financial 
institutions, charitable organizations, and philanthropists to contribute generously 
towards the alleviation of the catastrophic humanitarian situation prevailing in 
Somalia.   
 
4. The meeting affirmed that the humanitarian crisis in Somalia represents a huge 
challenge to all Member States and the international community at large, and called 
for taking urgent measures to alleviate the human suffering by providing food, and 
non-food items, water, shelter, healthcare and nutrition to the affected populations. 
Furthermore, the meeting urged all Member States, financial institutions, 
humanitarian organizations and philanthropists to generously contribute to the Somali 
Trust Fund created by the 38th Council of Foreisn Ministers to contain the adverse 






5.  The meeting highly commended the efforts made by the OIC General Secretariat 
since the beginning of this crisis and affirmed that the OIC has become an effective 
and trustable humanitarian player in Somalia. The meeting further welcomed the 
creation of the OIC Coalition for Somalia in Istanbul on 28'h July 2011, and the 
appeal made by the OIC Secretary General to supporthe humanitarian efforls of the 
OIC in this regard. The meeting also called upon Member States, financial 
institutions, humanitarian organizations and philanthropists to offer generous 
voluntary contributions towards the success of the campaign.  
 
6. The meeting further requested Member States, in coordination with the General 
Secretariat to carry out telethon fund-raising activities during the second parl of the 
Holy month of Ramadan for the urgent benefit of the famine affected people of 
Somalia, and also requested Member States, to facilitate the opening of Bank 
Accounts by the General Secretariat to receive voluntary contributions from financial 
institutions, humanitarian organizations and philanthropists, for the famine-affected 
people in Somalia, as well as for the current and future humanitarian assistance 
campaigns to be conducted by the OIC.  
 
7. The meeting expressed thanks for the contributions made and pledges announced so 
far by Turkey, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Islamic Republic of Iran, Gabon, 
Qatar, Bahrain. Algeria, Egypt, Kazakhstan, Malaysia and Senegal towards the 
alleviation of the famine crisis in Somalia and calls upon other Member States to 
fbllow suit.  
 
8. The meeting called upon the IlN, and international community in general, to mobilize 
all possible resourceso as to collectively face the catastrophic humanitarian crisis in 
the Horn of Africa, especially, Somalia and expressed the readiness of the General 
Secretariat and Humanitarian Coordination Office in Mogadishu, respectively, to 
cooperate accordingly.  
 
9. In this context the meeting took note of the preliminary work undertaken in relation to 




2010. as a useful mechanism  to ensure an effective coordination of efforts between 
the OIC and the rest of the international community.  
 
10. The meeting decided to set up an Ad-hoc Task Force composed of Kazakhstan, 
Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Senegal and the General Secretariat so as to closely follow-up 
the humanitarian situation in the Horn of Africa, especially Somalia and to take 
appropriate action as deemed necessary.  
 
11. The meeting called for strengthening cooperation with appropriate UN agencies, 
African Union, European Union, League of Arab States and IDB with a view to 
exchange ideas and draft an action plan on OIC food security system.  
 
12. The meeting urged all rebel groups in Somalia to stop the fighting and allow 
humanitarian stakeholders to provide the much needed vital humanitarian assistance 
without hindrance, by facilitating easy access to all areas of the country. The meeting 
also solemnly called on all Member States and the international community at large to 
help in solving the crisis in Somalia by tackling the deep-rooted causes of the 
persistent civil strife ravaging the country for over two decades.  
 
13. Noting the recurrence of crises and humanitarian disasters in Member States and the 
need to act collectively and promptly to address the urgent needs of the affected 
countries, the meeting called on the General Secretariat to expedite the establishment 
of the OIC Emergency Response Fund.  
 
14. The meeting finally expressed their thanks to the Government of the Republic of 
Turkey for hosting and to the Foreign Minister of Kazakhstan for chairing this vital 
meeting and to the OIC Secretary General for his initiatives towards reversing the 
unprecedented adverse effects of the crisis faced by the brotherly Somali people. 
 





Appendix 4: Istanbul gathering of Somali civil society – Communique 
Wednesday, May 30, 2012 
We, the participants of the Istanbul Civil Society gathering, consisting of Somali traditional 
elders, religious scholars, academics, organized polities, activists, women, youth, business 
and diaspora representatives, came together to discuss and evaluate the difficult conditions 
and existential threats facing our nation. The main objective of this gathering is to bridge the 
divisions within our society and focus our efforts and energies in building a sovereign, united, 
just, peaceful, democratic and prosperous Somalia. 
Somali participants have been able to gather in an environment free of political pressures, 
interventions, candidate interests, and manipulation by foreign special interest operatives. 
During the four day conference, the participants have identified and discussed many 
important issues through an interactive process designed to facilitate the expression  of 
thoughts and ideas. The conference examined issues such as security, the constitution, 
economic reconstruction, social development, transitional justice and reconciliation. Eight 
groups  representing  varieties of perspectives   discussed and debated each of these topics. 
Each group  presented their recommendations to the plenary sessions where their suggestions 
and ideas were further scrutinized,  discussed and agreed upon. 
The conference resolved that: 
We are immeasurably grateful to the Turkish government and its people and we encourage 
the Republic of Turkey to continue its support and solidarity with the Somali people, to 
realize a Somalia that holds itself up to international standards and reclaims its position as a 
respected member of the family of nations. 
We are appreciative of the role of Turkey   in convening this gathering in an environment that 
was constructive and fully supportive of the resurrection of the Somali state and the dignity 
of its people. 
We unequivocally support the conclusion of the transition period  by August 20, 2012. 
Security 
Establish an inclusive and effective national security forces under a civilian command; create  
a National Defense Commission to ensure continuity regardless of any changes within the 




Somali forces; inaugurate  an allowance and salary commission to make sure that members of 
the security forces’ welfare is budgeted and protected; request the lifting of the UN Arms 
Embargo as soon as an inclusive and disciplined army is established; create an independent 
judicial system  to examine the injustices that have occurred in Somalia; improve correctional 
institutions to meet the international human rights standards ; and request that AMISOM be 
converted into hybrid UN peacekeeping force and that includes additional forces from 
Muslim countries to counter Al-Shabab propaganda that Somalia has been invaded by non-
Muslim forces. 
Economic reconstruction 
Developing effective, transparent, mutually accountable, and coordinated foreign aid policy 
to reduce dependency; build an effective taxation policy and administration; establish 
effective business regulation and enforcement system; convene  a comprehensive conference 
on recovery and development that should be held as soon as feasible; adopt an effective 
accountability and transparency in all financial resources management; encourage private and 
public partnerships (PPP); institute  effective poverty alleviation programs for the most 
vulnerable groups to reduce poverty; establish skill-building projects and focus on equal 
opportunities in order to reverse the massive brain drain of the past two decades; and  create 
rural development programs that are essential in ensuring sustainable means of livelihood. 
Social development 
Institute a national education policy that standardizes the curriculum of the current multiple 
educational systems; provide free primary and secondary education for all; identify youth 
development programs as national priority area for sustainable peace; provide social 
development programs including adult and vocational training for the youth;  health care and 
health education programs; clean water; establish national policies to address the continued 
marginalization of women in all sectors of society; and provide  incentives for highly skilled 
Somalis to return and contribute to the reconstruction of the country, create an independent 
National Somali Diaspora Association. 
Reconciliation 
The participants identified several causes that have perpetuated the violence in Somalia such 
as injustice, repression, land-grabbing, tribalism, corruption, and poverty. Therefore, the 




reconciliation process; end the culture of impunity and pressuring those who committed 
crimes to accept their responsibility; offer confidence-building measures in order to attain 
peace and reconciliation; engage all opposition groups; abolish the 4.5 formula and replacing 
it with 5 formula until a one person one vote system is achieved; form a second chamber for 
the traditional leaders; establish multi party-based politics and electoral system in which each 
party must have supporters in all regions; establish a truth and reconciliation commission to 
resolve the outstanding grievances. 
Constitution 
A social contract of this magnitude could not and should not be endorsed in haste, while 
blind-folded or in contention or under a cloud of suspicion. Therefore, sufficient time must be 
given to the Constituent Assembly and the Somali people to scrutinize and digest any and all 
additions and omissions within the new constitution. The Conference participants welcome 
the efforts to establish a constitution for Somalia and view it as a necessary national 
imperative; express grave concern about the prolonged and the unnecessary secrecy 
surrounding the progress of the new Draft Constitution; urge the Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG) to release the latest version of the Draft-Constitution to the Somali public 
as soon as possible in order to ensure inclusiveness, and broad based participation and 
consensus; underline their firm resolve that the Somali Constitution must be based on the 
basic sources of Islam, namely the Quran and Sunna; call upon the TFG to make the 
constitution-making process transparent and a Somali owned process; call for the creation of 
permanent and institutional role for Somali traditional leaders in the governance system. 
Moreover, there is a controversy on the issue of “u-dhashay-ku-dhashay” and the conference 
recommends further discussion and consensus on the issue. The conference supports that 
women should get 30% representation in the parliament and all select committees; 
Participants did not reach a consensus on the “Federalism” principle and there was a 
recommendation for a broad national debate and discussion. 
Transition 
The transition must end on August 20, 2012 and be replaced with a durable and democratic 
state that is based on Islam; there is a need for functioning,  strong, national and just 
government.; all government institutions must be led by competent people; traditional leaders 
must be the reference point (second chamber); the participants call for the establishment of 




regions; Somalis are equal and therefore favoritism, tribalism and nepotism should end;  the 
Somali language consists of two – May and Maxaa Tiri. National media outlets should 
broadcast in both; the government must fight against corruption; the committee proposed 
increasing the number of the parliamentarians from 225 to 275; the terms of reference for the 
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